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Abstract
This report examines the growing involvement of the private sector in water services
and the ability of private sector participation to improve access to water services for
the poorest citizens, especially in light of the UN Millennium Development Goals.
Private Sector Participation (PSP) has been problematic in the area of improving
access to water for poor people due to the special nature of water, particularly the
difficulty in reconciling the economic value of the water itself as well as the service
and the social value of water services. Determining the appropriate role of the
regulator after the privatisation agreement goes through has also been the source of
many problems, as PSP is often implemented in areas with a weak regulatory
environment. In addition, in 1992 the concept of Integrated Water Resource
Management (IWRM) was developed that created a new method of water
management that called for a more holistic view of water resources and water
services. IWRM calls for increased stakeholder participation in the water management
process and a recognition of water's ecological and economic value.
In order to discuss and analyse PSP in relation to IWRM, two desk studies are used:
the first concerns the PSP initiative in Cochabamba Bolivia and the second concerns
the implementation of IWRM in South Africa and the implementation of the policy of
Free Basic Water. The first desk study weights the economic value of water more
heavily than the social value while the second desk study focuses more on the social
value, than on the economic value. Four focus areas are identified for the analysis of
the desk studies that address balancing the social and economic nature of water and
assessing the institutional arrangements for water management. They include:
extending access to marginal areas, affordability, community participation and
transparency and the role of the regulator. Finally, it is suggested that increased
efforts are needed to address the capacity building needs of local regulatory
authorities and to assist in the creation of avenues of communication for community
influence on water management decisions. The combination of a weak regulatory
environment, a well organised utility in an area with little to no stakeholder
participation will not result in improved access for poor people. Instead, private
utilities and water regulators should attempt to reconcile the economic, social and
environmental values of water in the privatisation agreement in a way that reflects
these values and improves access to water services to poor communities.
Keywords
Private Sector Participation (PSP), Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM),
Water Management, Bolivia, South Africa, Social goods, Economic goods and
Institutional Arrangements
Resumé
Specialet vurderer den private sektors øgede interesse for vandforsyning og de deraf
følgende muligheder for forbedring af fattige menneskers adgang til vand, specielt
med hensyn til FNs millennium målsætninger. I forbindelse med forbedring af fattige
menneskers adgang til vand, har privatisering været problematisk på grund af den
særlige afhængighed afvand og de vanskeligheder, der er ved at få de sociale og
økonomiske aspekter afvand og vandforsyning til at stemme overens. Desuden er der
opstået mange problemer med at afgøre den mest passende rolle af den myndighed,
der regulerer vandforsyningen, efter vandværket er blevet privatiseret, fordi
privatisering ofte sker i områder, hvor den offentlige sektor kun er svagt regulerende.
Derudover blev konceptet omkring Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM)
udviklet i 1992. Det førte til en ny metode til at styre vandforsyning, baseret på et
mere holistisk syn på både vandressourcer og vandforsyning. De grundlæggende
principper bag IWRM er øget borgerdeltagelse i vandforsyningens styringsproces og
en anerkendelse af de økologiske, sociale og økonomiske værdier, vand har.
Analysen og diskussionen af PSP i forhold til IWRM tager udgangspunkt i studiet af
to forskellige sager (baseret på samtaler og litteraturstudier): den første sag beskriver
PSP i Cochabamba Bolivia og den anden omhandler dels implementeringen af IWRM
i Sydafrika, og dels implementering af regeringens lovforslag vedrørende gratis vand
{Free Basic Water). Den første sagsbehandling lægger mere vægt på den økonomiske
værdi afvand, hvorimod den anden fokuserer mere på den sociale værdi afvand, og
mindre på den økonomiske værdi. Der er defineret fire fokusområder i analysen af de
to sager, som berører afbalanceringen af de sociale og økonomiske aspekter afvand
og vurderer de institutionelle faciliteter for vandforsyning. Disse inkluderer: udvidelse
af adgang i perifere områder, anskaffelsesmulighed, borgerdeltagelse og
gennemsigtighed, og den institutionelle rolle af den vandregulerende myndighed.
Rapporten konkluderer, at der er behov for ekstra bestræbelser for at øge den lokale
vandmyndigheds kapacitet og for at skabe bedre kommunikationskanaler, således at
borgerne kan få indflydelse på beslutningsprocessen vedrørende vandforsyning.
Kombinationen af en svag offentlig regulering og et velorganiseret vandværk i et
område med kun lidt eller helt uden befolkningens tilslutning, vil ikke resultere i
bedre adgang til vand for fattige mennesker. I stedet skulle private vandværker og de
ansvarlige myndigheder forsøge at skabe et samspil mellem vandets
økonomiske, sociale og miljømæssige værdier på en måde, der afspejler disse værdier
og forbedrer adgangen til vandforsyning for fattige befolkningsgrupper.
Stikord
Privatisering (PSP), vandforsyning, Integrated Water Resource Management
(IWRM), Bolivia, Sydafrika, Sociale goder, økonomiske goder, Institutionelle
arrangementer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main objective of this study is to assess the opportunities and constraints of private sector
participation (PSP) in the water sector and the extent to which PSP can improve access to
water services for poor people. This objective will be achieved through a description and
analysis of the various services that can be privatised and by defining the responsibilities that
need to be left in the hands of the state. Finally, the feasibility of PSP will be gauged by
addressing the extent to which access to water services can be extended to poor areas, the
affordability of water services, the level of community participation and transparency in the
decision-making process and lastly, the role and responsibilities of the regulator. The
following chapter will introduce the connection between water and poverty, a series of
international conferences that specifically addressed the increased involvement of the private
sector in the water sector and the main issues in the privatisation debate. This chapter will
also go on to present the problem formulation, and methodologies applied to this study.
1.1 Motivation
The issue of access to water caught my attention for the first time in November of 2002,
when it was declared by the UN that access to water was a human right in general comment
15. Water is one of the primary keys to development. Water access is necessary for health
and life and given adequate access to water, people have the opportunity to improve their
prospects for education and economic advancement. Water access also has a particular
importance to women, because it is generally women and girls who are burdened with
collecting water for the family and furthermore, girls in some cultures are often prohibited
from attending primary school due to inappropriate toilet facilities.1 Within this context, the
goal of this project is to determine how privatisation efforts could be improved so that they
can achieve the desired result of integrating the social and economic aspects of water and
extended access to poor people who have limited access to water. In addition, I also intend to
demonstrate that despite innovations in water management thinking, (from public ownership,
to PSP, to integrated water management) the same problems persist regarding the extension
of water access to poor people, affordability, community participation and transparency and
defining the role of the regulator. I will argue throughout this thesis that PSP does have a vital
role to play in extending water services to poor people and that this goal can best be achieved
by integrating aspects of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). Early on in my
research, it became clear that some level of PSP would be necessary to meet the millennium
development goals. My central area of inquiry has never been whether or not privatisation
should be allowed, instead I have concentrated on how PSP can be improved to achieve the
1
 WHO, 2003. Right to Water. Geneva: WHO, p. 25 available at:
(http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/rightowater/en/ (Accessed July, 2004)
desired result. Addressing this issue is important because private sector solutions for the
allocation and distribution of public water is a relatively new approach that continues to be
met with resistance (as illustrated by the Cochabamba desk study).
1.2 The connection between access to water and poverty
alleviation
Currently, more than a billion people worldwide, lack access to adequate, safe drinking water
and over two and a half billion lack basic sanitation. Thousands of people die every day from
preventable water-related diseases including diarrhoea, which causes 4% of deaths annually,
and cholera, both of which are easily prevented when people have regular and adequate
access to clean drinking water and sanitation2. Recently there has been pressure, both at the
international and national level, to focus more attention on extending the provision of
drinking water and sanitation services to poor communities throughout the developing world.
Due to the above mentioned health figures, which will be exacerbated by population growth
during the next 20 years3, organizations including the United Nations are devising new
methods to address the pressing issue of unequal access and allocation of water resources.
The UN estimates that if improved water supply and basic sanitation were extended to current
"unserved" areas, the level of infectious diarrhoeas would be reduced by 17%. Furthermore,
if a well regulated, piped water supply system and full sanitation system were extended to
unserved areas, the level would drop by 70%.4
The urgent problem of deciding upon the most efficient means of delivering water services to
the people who need it most is an issue that is both very complicated and emotionally
charged. This problem is made more complex by natural water scarcity and water stress,
competition for water resources and a lack of money, political will or a combination of the
above which creates barriers to building the infrastructure necessary to meet the needs of
poor communities. The benefits of water access go far beyond the initial health benefits
mentioned above. Lack of access to water affects all aspects of people's basic needs
including, food security and basic livelihoods.5 Improving access to water has the potential to
alleviate poverty on a large scale. The health problems associated with water have a major
effect on the ability of people in underserved communities to find employment and be
educated. In addition, women and children are usually responsible for fetching water, which
can be time consuming and which may prevent them from pursuing other activities and
education.6
The problem of access to water in marginalized communities has led to a situation in which
people buy their potable water from private vendors, who charge prices well in excess of the
price for a regulated, pumped water service. Water vendors often provide access to a water
supply in areas not served by the central water system and the presence of independent water
vendors often can indicate deficiencies in the ability of the water authority to provide
adequate water services to chiefly poor, residential communities. This means that a large
proportion of the household income is used to pay for water. Reduced water prices would
2
 The World Health Organization, Water, Sanitation and Health page:
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/en/ (Accessed July, 2004
3
 Ibid
4
 UN, 2003. Water for People, Water for Life. Barcelona: Berghahn Books p.108
5
 Ibid p. 6
6
 Ibid 4
help poor people save money and potentially have a positive effect on economic growth.7
There has been increasing international attention on the connection between water and
poverty which is why alternative solutions for water provision, and increased questioning of
the traditional state-run utility system, has led water experts to seek new models of water
governance.
Increased involvement of the private sector in the building, maintenance, management and
operation of water utilities is one of the solutions that international aid foundations, such as
the World Bank and other development finance institutions, have chosen to pursue to address
the problems associated with lack of access to water. The issue of involving private
companies in water services is at the centre of a heated debate. Traditionally water services
have been provided by the public sector. Approximately 20 years ago, private, multinational
companies began getting involved in the management, administration and partial ownership
of water utilities. In a report from 2002, the World Bank recommended a strategy that
included the decentralisation of water service providers so that water projects might become
more accessible to the public and thereby create opportunities for stakeholder involvement.
They listed "private firms, financially autonomous entities and community organizations" as
potential vehicles for decentralization.9 The following section will provide a brief overview
of the major conferences and water related policy goals, which have influenced the degree to
which private companies have become involved in providing water services.
1.3 International Conferences Addressing the issue of Private
Sector Participation in the Water Sector
There have been several conferences in recent years that have directly addressed the influence
of the private sector on improving access to drinking water and sanitation services for poor
people. In addition, during the Dublin Conference a new set of principles was developed to
improve public and private water management systems.
1.3.1 The Dublin/ Rio Principles
In 1992, the International Conference on Water and the Environment was held in Dublin as a
preparatory meeting prior to the Rio Conference on Environment and Development. It
established four main principles for water management at the global and local level: 1) that
water is a "finite and valuable resource", 2) that water be managed by a "participatory
approach", 3) that women are key stakeholders in water management and 4) that water should
be "recognised as an economic good. These principles are the guiding principles of IWRM
which approaches water management from a holistic and sustainable standpoint. IWRM
principles, for improved water management can be implemented in either a privately operated
utility or a public utility. Principle 4 of the Dublin/ Rio principles is of particular interest in
this thesis because refers to water as an economic good, which has changed the way water is
regarded and managed in many areas of the world, primarily through the privatisation of
7
 Ibid p. 8
8
 This debate will be discussed at length in Chapter 2.
9
 Pitman, George, K., 2002. Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategy.
The World Bank: Washington D.C. p.43
10
 http://www.gwpforum.org/servlet/PSP?iNodeID=1345 (Accessed July, 2004)
water services. The assertion that water is an economic good initiated a heated debate about
the effect of privatising water utilities.
Moreover, at the 1992 conference in Rio, it was recognised that the connection between
poverty and environmental problems is closely related and that solutions to both local and
global problems need to be solved through an integrated approach that addresses the social,
as well as the economic aspects of water provision.
1.3.2 The UN Millennium Goals
The issues of both privatisation and an urgent need to ameliorate the water and poverty
problem were addressed in the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Under Goal 7,
Ensure environmental sustainability, Target 10: "By 2015, reduce by half the proportion of
people without access to safe drinking water", indicator 29 adds the "proportion of population
with sustainable access to an improved water source". At the Earth Summit the UN
Millennium Declaration Target 10 was amended to include: "by 2015: half the proportion of
people without access to hygienic sanitation facilities" . In addition, the text of the
Millennium Declaration states: "We resolve to develop strong partnerships with the private
sector and with civil society organizations in pursuit of development and poverty
eradication", once again connecting social development issues with assistance from the
private sector.
1.3.3 The Third World Water Forum and General Comment 15 on The
Human Right to Water
In preparation for the International Year of Freshwater, and the Third World Water
Conference, in November of 2002, the UN Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, issued General Comment #15 which asserts: "Water and water facilities and services
have to be accessible to everyone without discrimination... ". The comment also reaffirms
water as an integral part of several human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) among other treaties and covenants. In accordance with other human
rights, compliance is subdivided into 3 categories, the right to: protect, respect and fulfil.
Under the subcategory of protecting the right to water, General Comment 15 mentions " the
obligation to protect requires State parties to prevent third parties from interfering in any way
with the enjoyment of the right to water."14 The document goes on to specify that third parties
include corporations and then stipulates: "where water services are operated or controlled by
third parties, States parties must prevent them from compromising equal, affordable and
physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable water" 5. Here General Comment 15 again
draws a connection between private sector investments in water services with a development
problem. General Comment 15 is different than the aforementioned treaties and declarations
in terms of its approach to the privatisation issue. The tone of the document seems to favour
11
 United Nations, A/RES/55/2 United Nations Millennium Declaration, Target, 18 September, 2000
12
 Ibid, Target 11, indicator 30.
13
 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, E/C. 12/2002/11 General Comment No. 15 (2002): The right to
water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) Geneva, 11-29
November 2002. p. 6
14
 Ibid Paragraph 23
15
 Ibid Paragraph 24
public control of water service as well as strict control and regulation when those services are
operated by a third party, namely a private company.
All three documents focus on the water - poverty connection. They also allude to the role, or
possible role the private sector could play in enhancing and extending the provision of water
services to marginal areas. Meeting the goals as outlined in the MDGs in addition to
implementing the changes to water policy, would affect the way we conceptualise water, as a
good. Finally, substantive changes in water services will take a great deal of initiative and
funding from the international community, national governments and local communities if
countries are to meet the MDGs. Private solutions may be one option for improved
development of water services. The privatisation of the water sector is an issue that has
sparked heated debate worldwide. The following section will describe more about the issues
on both sides of this debate.
1.4 The main issues in the privatisation debate
The issue of whether or not to privatise a public water utility has given rise to a very heated
debate. On one side are multinational water companies such as Vivendi and Suez Lyonnaise
des Eaux who own water utilities in over 120 countries and see water as a safe investment.16
Due to the monopolistic nature of water provision, (only one operator can own and use the
same infrastructure) they are guaranteed customers and therefore a profit. On the other side
are anti-globalisation activists, communities who have been negatively impacted by
privatisation agreements and groups that believe that water is fundamentally a public good
and human right.
These individuals and organizations believe that the increased globalisation and privatisation
of the water sector can and will harm people. The reason for large anti-privatisation
campaigns is that there have been several cases of rapid implementation of private sector
involvement, where the parties involved displayed a blatant disregard for the needs of the
poor. This has left human rights activists, environmentalists and anti-globalisation activists,
among others, categorically opposed to any private sector involvement in any areas of water
management. The Council of the Canadians has been one of the most vocal activist groups
opposed to privatisation of the water sector, on any level. They feel that water is a public
trust, which belongs to everyone and that no one person or company has the right to profit off
such a water resource. However, in many cases privatisation occurs when a public utility is
unable to meet the needs of the people and cannot provide the necessary amount of water
services to the residential sector or divert a sufficient amount either to the agricultural or
industrial sectors.
The debate raises some important issues of the appropriateness of the private sector in the
water sector and the very real concern that private companies will be more concerned with
their profit than the welfare of the people in their service area. This thesis will focus on the
appropriateness of private sector solutions and ways for both private companies and public
utilities to address the issues of extending access to marginal areas, the affordability of water
services, the importance of community participation in increasing transparency to limit
corruption and the defining the appropriate role of the regulator. These issues represent areas
16
 www.suez.com, www.veoliawatersystems.com (Accessed July, 2004)
17
 http://www.canadians.org
of water management that have been difficult for both private and public utilities to
appropriately address and solve and the introduction of privatisation often highlights
problems in these areas.
1.5 Problem Formulation
The involvement of the private sector in operating municipal water utilities and its ability to
address the urgent, yet not so profitable, issue of extending water access to the poor will be
the focus of this study. Addressing the specific issue of privatisation in the water sector is
important because many public utilities lack the resources to create meaningful change that
benefit all the water users in their service area. Privatisation is seen as a means of introducing
technological advances in the infrastructure system, tapping other water resources, increasing
efficiency and providing funding for municipal water services. These changes can have a
positive impact, such as repairing leaks extending service and introducing socially sensitive
water tariffs. However, problems have occurred, where a lack of communication and
coordination with the local water regulator has led to the secession of concession agreements
and even civil unrest. Despite past problems with the implementation privatisation contracts,
continued dependence on outside funding from international development finance
institutions, which have promoted private sector participation in the past, means that we can
expect more private sector involvement in the future. In order to improve water access for
poor people is important to question the ability of private utilities to be sensitive to the social,
and not just the economic aspects of water. Selling water to consumers already hooked-up to
a network does not present the same kind of technical and political challenge as extending
access to poor people living in marginal areas. The urgent need to constructively address the
water-poverty development problem together with the possibility that assistance from the
private sector could lead to, at least, a partial solution to this problem leads to the following
problem formulation.
What are the opportunities and constraints regarding the feasibility of private sector
participation in the water sector with respect to successfully promoting equity in the
distribution and allocation of drinking water and sanitation to poor people?
The key to addressing this research question is to decide upon and define the main factors
that must be considered if private sector solutions are to be improved. Addressing this issue
requires first identifying the constraints and current problems of PSP implementation which
will be done in chapters 2 and 3. As several problem areas are present in PSP implementation
four problem areas have been selected on the basis of relevant literature18 and the outcome of
the two desk studies used later in this thesis to examine respectively PSP implementation and
IWRM implementation. The specific use and selection of these desk studies will be discussed
18
 Gutierrez, Eric et. al., 2003. Synthesis Report: New Rules, New Roles: Does PSP Benefit the Poor. WaterAid
and TearFund: London
Available at: http://www.wateraid.org/in_depth/policy_and_research/private_sector_participation/default.asp
(Accessed July, 2004)
And Gleick, Peter H.; Wolff, Gary; Chalecki, Elizabeth L.; Reyes, Rachel, 2002. The New Economy of Water:
The Risks and Benefits of Globalization and Privatization of Fresh Water. Pacific Institute for Studies in
Development, Environment and Security: Oakland, California, p. vi Available at:
www.pacinst.org/reports/new_economy_of:water.pdf (Accessed July, 2004)
And Gleick, Peter, 2002. The World's Water 2002-2003: The Biennial Report on the World's Freshwater
Resources. Washington D.C.: Island Press
later in this section. The four focus areas are as follows: 1) extending access, 2) affordability,
3) community participation and increased transparency and 4) determining the appropriate
role of the regulator. These four focus areas are problematic for both public utilities and
private utilities however, the introduction of PSP tends to highlight the difficulty with
reconciling the economic value of water services with the social value of providing the
service. The underlying reasons for why these particular four issues are problematic will be
discussed and analysed, first in relation to PSP generally (chapters 2, 3 and 4) and then in
terms of the desk studies (chapter 5). A survey of the current approaches to addressing these
problem areas will be discussed and analysed in chapter 3 as well as the strengths and
weaknesses of these approaches. In particular, the concept of IWRM, which represents a
current trend in thinking about water management, especially in relation to the issue of
community participation and transparency, will be presented in chapter 3. Chapter 5 will
present the two desk studies and highlight problems with both PSP and IWRM
implementation in these four focus areas in specific contexts. Finally, suggestions for a
revised and improved approach to PSP will be suggested on the basis of analysis of these
areas in chapter 6. In order to narrow the focus of the four problem areas, four working
questions have been developed:
1) How are the economic and social values of water reconciled, or accounted, for when
attempting to extend access to marginal areas?
2) What is the most effective method of making water services affordable for the poorest
citizens?
3) In what way could community participation in water decision-making improve
transparency and influence both the water authority and the water regulator? What is
the most appropriate model of participation?
4) What is the appropriate role of the regulator? Are there some functions that should
always remain in public hands under privatisation?
These working questions are relevant for this study because although there are a number of
important issues associated with privatisation, in general these issues have been particularly
problematic in both PSP and government run IWRM initiatives. Because lack of resolution of
these issues has been the source of many significant problems, I have chosen to focus upon
them to question the ability of PSP to make appropriate changes in its current method of
implementation. The reasons for concentrating upon these areas will be further specified in
section 2.3.
1.6 Concept Clarification
The terms privatisation and private sector participation (PSP) are very ambiguous.
Throughout this thesis, and in chapter 2 in particular, I will describe in detail the differences
between the different kinds of privatisation agreements and will refer to a specific operating
structure if appropriate to the context. Although there are many different forms of
privatisation agreements, I will primarily focus on concession agreements and variations of
BOOT (Build Own Operate Transfer) agreements. Briefly, the majority of agreements can be
categorised as: service contracts, management contracts, leases, BOOT contracts, divesture
and concessions. Out of the above-mentioned options, BOOT and concessions are the most
popular options for PSP agreements and are the options that are most commonly linked with
privatisation agreements that involve multinational utilities.19 BOOT contracts allow the
private contractor to build, own, operate and transfer the specific investment such as a
wastewater treatment plant. Generally, the investment period is long enough so that the
contracting company can recover its capital expenditure on the investment. As part of a
BOOT agreement, the public authority usually specifies a certain demand to be met, such as
cubic litres of wastewater per day to be treated. Concessions are long-term contracts, which
require the private company to invest in the system. The concessionaire has the overall
responsibility for the system including day-to-day operations, and maintenance (O&M) for
which it receives payment for services directly from the consumer. In addition to these larger
privatisation schemes, which are dominated by large multinational companies, there are
small-scale private water providers, which have the skills and experience to contribute to
increased water access in marginal areas. Although many of these small-scale providers
distribute water on a smaller scale and provide low-tech solutions for distribution (stand
pumps and concrete slabs for simple latrines), they may become increasingly important in
providing long-term solutions to current inequities in water allocation and distribution.20
Another issue related to privatisation is the issue of treating water as an economic good. An
economic good is a scarce good and regarding which competition over this resource creates a
situation where the price of the resource limits its availability to other users. Privatisation
generally involves modifying the pricing structure so that consumers must pay for the full
economic value of the water service. When this occurs, pricing water as an economic good
may result in a price generally higher than many people are used to paying for the provision
of water services.
1.6.1 Definitions
The use of the word equity in the problem formulation refers to a "freedom from bias or
favouritism" or "justice according to natural law or right".21 In this study, the word equity can
be construed in two ways. The equitable management of water resources should seek to
redress past inequities in allocation or distribution which could be either 1) between sector
(ie: agriculture and industry have their water needs met before the needs of residential areas
and the natural environment or 2) within the residential sector where wealthy families, with a
house connection are allocated water without taking into account the need to allocate water to
the poorest citizens, who are thereby left without an adequate water supply. An example of
this would be in South Africa under apartheid where scarce water resources were allocated to
rich white areas before they were allocated to townships.
The definition of the term poor people used throughout this thesis refers to people living on
less than $2 a day. An individual is considered poor, according to the World Bank, if their
"consumption or income level falls below some minimum level necessary to meet basic
needs. This minimum level is usually called the "poverty line"."22 The issue of defining a
poverty line is highly context dependent and varies from country to country. For the purposes
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of this study, 1.2 billion people live on less than $ 1 per day23 - roughly equivalent to the
same number of people lacking access to safe drinking water. 2.8 billion people live on less
than $2 a day24, again roughly equivalent to the number of people without sanitation
facilities. Since this thesis focuses on people without access to either safe drinking water or
sanitation services (or both) poor people are defined as those living on less than $2 per day.
Although PSP occurs in developing and industrial countries, limiting the scope of this study
to people with an income under $2 per day delimits the study primarily to poor people living
in developing countries as this level of poverty is not as widespread in industrialised nations.
Social Good- from an economic point of view a social good is a good that has a significant
"spillover" effect, which is to say that it creates benefits and value in a way that is not
reflected in the economic price.25 Water is necessary for health and life and is a social good
because the benefit of regular access to a safe water supply improves community health, the
availability of education and can act as a catalyst for economic development.2 Benefits of
this nature, although associated with access to water services, cannot be measured by
standard economic measures.
Economic Good-competition over a scarce resource creates a situation where the price of the
resource limits its availability to other users.27
Private Good-a good that if consumed by one person cannot be consumed by another person
and access to this good is restricted.28
Public Good-a good that even if consumed by one person, can still be consumed by other
people; access to this good cannot be easily controlled and is free to all.29
Common-Pool Resource (CPR)- a resource that excludes potential users through physical or
institutional means and where access to the resource is difficult to restrict and one users
consumption of the good reduces the amount of the good available to other users. Common-
Pool goods are regulated based on a set of rules that are mutually agreed upon by the users.30
Externality- the production or consumption of a good directly affects businesses and users not
involved in buying or selling it and when those unintended outcomes are not reflected in the
market price.31
Private water vendors -Private water vendors are entrepreneurs who sell water from tanks on
trucks where water is not readily available.
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IWRM- IWRM is a process, which promotes the co-ordinated development and management
of water. IWRM is based on a participatory approach to water management as well as a
recognition of the environmental, social and economic value of water.32
1.7 Chapter Overview
Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical methodology of this thesis. The theoretical
background and presentation of Ostrom's theory of institutional rational choice, and presents
her framework for classifying goods and services as it relates to the water sector. The choice
of the two desk studies is also presented as well as the analysis of working questions.
Chapter 3 will outline the different forms of PSP in terms of the level of ownership of both
water resources and infrastructure assets. This chapter will also compare the options and
discuss the main drivers and risks of privatisation. The conceptual background of IWRM will
also be presented in this chapter, including the details of the Dublin Principles.
Chapter 4 uses the framework of Serageldin's triangles of Sustainability to discuss the
economic and social values of water in relation to each other and the need to find a way to
reconcile these two aspects of water in an institutional framework for water management.
Chapter 5 includes descriptions and analysis of the two desk studies. It will begin with the
Bolivian desk study examining Bechtel's operations, a prime example of why PSP is
regarded with some scepticism. The responsibilities of private companies will be examined
with reference to the criteria named in the introduction. Finally, the role of the state in PSP
will be addressed using South Africa's national water policy as a guide to balancing the
social, economic and environmental aspects of water allocation and including public
participation in water allocation.
Chapter 6 will take stock of the ability of private companies to extend access to poor
communities by presenting a set of criteria that combine aspects of both PSP and IWRM. The
criteria form the basis for the conditions of feasibility for the involvement of private
companies in water provision in a way that will benefit poor people. The focus of the chapter
will be the combination of extension of services to marginal areas, the affordability of the
service and how tariffs and subsidies can be used to promote conservation and demand
management in a way that is acceptable to consumers, increased transparency and appropriate
opportunities for community participation and determining the appropriate role of the
regulator. The chapter will conclude with some recommendations for context and institutional
arrangements needed for PSP to succeed in promoting equity in water allocation.
Chapter 7 contains concluding remarks and suggestions for a new approach to water
management.
32
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Chapter 2
Methodology
This chapter will review the theoretical and empirical methodological approaches applied in
this thesis. The theoretical methodology section will also present the conceptual background
of Ostrom's theory of institutional rational choice as well as discuss the ways in which the
theory will and will not be applied to determining the opportunities and constraints of PSP
and the ability of private utilities to improve equity in the distribution and allocation of water
to poor people. The empirical methodology section will also discuss the reasoning behind the
selection of the two desk studies and analyse the four working questions.
2.1. Theoretical Methodology
Throughout this thesis, competing views of how water as a good and service should be
characterised are presented to create a holistic view of the social, cultural, economic and
environmental aspects of water. The implementation of both PSP and IWRM has proven
difficult, for two main reasons. The first is balancing the social and economic values of water
through a market means, (i.e.: subsidies, cross-subsidies, tariff structures, etc.). The technical
aspects of providing drinking water and sanitation services are very capital intensive. While
the resource itself (raw water) may be "free" if independently collected, infrastructure
development and maintenance, the cleaning of wastewater and purifying of raw water require
a substantial investment. This is why consumers must pay for water services. Water has
commonly been under-priced and heavily subsidised by the government, which has led to an
inability of many public water utilities to function optimally; they are not bringing in enough
revenue to cover supply costs.1 In addition, population growth and migration to urban
(especially peri-urban areas) has put a strain on public utilities already dealing with large
amounts of debt.2 PSP has been largely driven by a need for capital investments in the water
sector to expand and repair the existing network. To cover these costs they institute price
structures that reflect the economic value of water but may not account for the social value of
water access. This problem will be discussed at length in chapter 4.
The second reason PSP and IWRM have proven difficult to implement is that the institutional
arrangements in place have been not always offered appropriate avenues for community
participation from key stakeholders, transparency of the privatisation process has not been a
priority and the role of the regulator has been unclear. Discussing and analysing these issues
is conducted with the aid of Elinor Ostrom's theory of institutional rational choice. Ostrom's
theory helps define the nature of water in the context of water service provision as well as
1
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with regard to the behaviour of competing users. Ostrom's theory will be used in two ways
throughout this thesis: 1) to define water services and the components of water services into
categories of goods and, 2) to determine the appropriateness of various institutional
arrangements for the management and regulation of water services. Ostrom's theory builds
upon Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons3 and is useful for examining the opportunities and
constraints of a more communicative form of water management, where consumers, water
service providers and regulators are active in defining their needs and institutional positions.
2.1.1 Revisiting Hardin's Commons
Garret Hardin's influential article: The Tragedy of the Commons which was originally
published in Science Magazine in 1968 has been used by many scholars and policy makers to
argue for centralized control of common-pool resources, among them freshwater resources,
because the actors in Hardin's commons paradigm are depicted as trapped in an inevitable
chain of events.4 Hardin uses the metaphor of grazing fields (or commons), cattle and
competing herdsmen to express the idea of overstepping the carrying capacity of a natural
resource because of the desire to maximize personal gain. According to Ostrom, the problem
with Hardin's argument is that he assumes that the herders are incapable of organizing and
creating a set of rules that will be mutually beneficial for all users. The rules are an integral
and necessary part of maintaining the sustainability of the resource for all users. In
communities all over the world, competing users from the same community have devised
methods of sharing the same resource while maintaining the integrity and sustainability of the
resource and therefore the ecosystem of which the resource is a part. Ostrom's theory departs
from Hardin's in that she argues that management of common-pool resources which include
freshwater resources, both basin and groundwater, can in many cases be managed by users
based on communication which results in commonly agreed upon rules that improve their
mutual outcomes.5
2.1.2 The Conceptual Background of Institutional Rational Choice
The main idea behind Ostrom's theory is that institutional arrangements can be made by
groups that depend upon and share the same resource so that all users can benefit from the
resource instead of only a few, who exploit the resource for their own advantage. Ostrom
uses a system to classify goods and services as private, public, toll or common-pool resources
(CPRs) based on their accessibility, or the felicity to exclude individuals from benefiting
from the resource, and by their subtractability. The term subtractability refers to the effect of
an individual's consumption of a good and how that affects the other users' ability to benefit
to the same or lesser degree from that same good. Below is a diagram that categorises the
four types of goods, it will be followed by an explanation of the properties intrinsic to each
good-type as well as a theoretical explanation of the best type of institutional arrangement for
managing the good.
3
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Subtraetability
Exclusion Difficult
Easy
Low
Public Goods
Toll Goods
High
Common-Pool Resources
Private Goods
Chart. 1 Source: Ostrom et.al. (1994)
2.1.2.1. Public Goods
Water resources are commonly referred to as public goods. This is problematic from a
theoretical standpoint because to qualify as a pure public good, means that an unlimited
number of people can use the same good simultaneously without reducing the amount of the
good available to both current and future users. Air is the best example of a public good.
Water, and especially water services, cannot qualify as pure public goods unless there is an
abundant supply that is accessible to all users and where access to the resource is difficult to
control. According to Ostrom's theory, public goods are most efficiently produced and
regulated by public institutional arrangements.7 This is because access to the resource is
difficult to control, therefore there are few economic incentives to attempting to regulate
access to the good, where because there is a limited supply, due to both natural and artificial
scarcity and a limited amount of water infrastructure. Public goods are also linked to social
goods this connection will be discussed at length in chapter 4.
2.1.2.2 Private Goods
Private Goods are goods that are both easy to exclude potential users and a high level of
subtraetability. The level of exclusion is considered high because an individual or group owns
the good. Within the context of water, water from a private water tank, located on the
consumers private property would be considered a private good because: 1) only the user can
access the good and 2) once the user has consumed some of the water from the well, neither
s/he nor any other user can consume that same water. Private goods are best regulated by
private institutional arrangements or through the market. Demand for the good gives
sufficient economic incentive to regulate and provide the good to consumers. The level of
demand and scarcity of the good generally dictates the price that both the user is willing to
pay and the producer is willing to sell, which covers production costs and provides a profit.
The growing privatisation of water services has led to treating and pricing water as a private
good, which means that access is grated via in house taps or delivery of bulk water to private
tanks. This treatment of water excludes the external benefits of water, in addition to the
immediate benefits (water for cooking or drinking) from potential users.
2.1.2.3 Common-Pool Goods
Common-Pool Goods or CPRs include natural and human constructed resources in which two
attributes are present 1) the difficulty of excluding potential users and 2) the subtraetability of
6
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the benefits of the resource by one user reduces resource availability and thereby benefits for
others.9 Exclusion and subtractability are the two attributes, which make CPRs unique from
other kinds of goods. According to Ostrom, regulating CPRs involves two distinct elements:
1) restricting access and 2) creating incentives. ° CPRs are considered as resources where the
resource base is so large that it is difficult (but not impossible) to restrict the access of
potential users. Incentives to protect and not exploit the resource are generally achieved by
assigning individual rights or shares of the resource. Another participatory method which is
widely applied in IWRM is public participation in the water allocation process. This provides
the individual water user with an opportunity to influence allocation and enhances a feeling
of stewardship over the resource in addition to helping the individual recognize other uses
and claims on the resource. More detail regarding the problems of regulating CPRs, or any
other type of good is presented in later sections of this chapter.
2.1.2.4 Toll Goods
Toll goods are goods are goods where it is easy to exclude potential users from the resource
and where subtractability is low. An example of a toll good is a metered water pump, where
the water drawn from the pump is plentiful. Access to the water is granted only after the
consumer has paid for access and since the water available to other users is abundant, the
subtractability is low; other users will also be able to benefit from this resource once they
have paid for access. There are no hard and fast rules for governing and regulating such a
resource. Depending on the context, both public and private arrangements can be applied.
Water services and sanitation is an example of a good that possesses the qualities of all 4
types of goods, dependent on the type of institutional arrangement in place and the natural or
perceived scarcity of locally available freshwater resources. The following section will
present some of the issues of monitoring and allocating access rights to different users,
especially as they pertain to CPRs.
2.1.3 Management Aspects of CPRs
An aspect of CPRs is that resource systems are thought of in terms of producing the
maximum amount of flow or product without harming the resource base. In the case of
groundwater resources or river basins, where the resource is renewable, an average recharge
rate can be factored in to determine the maximum amount of the resource that can be used
before affecting the resource's overall carrying capacity. Ostrom uses the term
"appropriation" to refer to the process of withdrawing resource units from the resource and
the term "appropriator" refers to consumers of the resource. She uses "providers" to describe
those who arrange for the provision of the resource and "producers" for anyone who
constructs, repairs or takes an action to ensure the sustainability of the resource system
itself.12 In the context of water provision, appropriation is the process of withdrawing water
for domestic, agricultural use (etc.). Appropriators are those that actually consume the water
or use water in the production of another product (food, industrial goods). The producer is
generally the state or the entity in charge of the water works system. Finally, the provider is
again, generally the entity in charge of water supply. All appropriators benefit from the
9
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maintenance and upkeep of the water system by the producer and provider, yet again, it is
difficult to restrict access to the resource. As previously mentioned, the hallmark of a CPR is
that it is difficult to restrict access and that users need incentives to comply with and commit
to the rules which are necessary to allocate and preserve the resource system. The problem of
enforcing commitment to the rules, which underpin the potential long-term sustainable
benefits of the resource and deter free-riding is a major problem in the implementation of
IWRM and catchment management agencies; this will be discussed in more detail in chapters
4 and 5.
Monitoring and commitment are the two problems in regulating a CPR. The individuals that
have organised together to regulate the CPR must all have a similar level of commitment to
following the rules for access to the resource. This means that the group must be internally
motivated to comply with the rules, even if breaking them would benefit them in the short
term. To assist in creating a culture of compliance a method of monitoring needs to be
devised. When discussing water services within the framework of Ostrom and balancing the
economic and social good aspects of water the active participation of stakeholders and
defining the role of the regulator and the water service utility is an important component.
Privatisation of the water utility presents a challenge to creating the appropriate institutional
arrangement to regulate access to water services because often the regulator and the utility do
not consult with the consumers, who are ultimately the individuals who will be monitored
and forced to comply with the rules as long as they want access to the resource.
Ostrom's theory is also useful when examining whether a public or private service provider is
the most appropriate choice to run the utility and for determining the most appropriate
institutional arrangement needed to secure the reliable provision of water services. The theory
does not go as far as to answer the question of whether a private or public form of ownership
and management is more appropriate in situations where it is difficult to exclude potential
beneficiaries of the resource. Instead, the theory covers areas where "... the types of
institutions that will be most efficient for governing and managing diverse CPRs for which at
least some potential beneficiaries can not be excluded".13 Water resources and services fit
very neatly into this category of a CPR as it is very difficult to exclude potential users and
currently one sixth of the world's population can be considered potential and unserved users.
The creation and maintenance of a CPR is dependant on a series of rules, indicators and
monitoring devises that promote compliance dialogue between users. These aspects of CPRs
will be discussed in more detail in chapters 3 and 6.
Although Ostrom's theory is very useful in examining the institutional arrangements for the
management of the water authority, I think her theory falls short of explaining other
important aspects that are specific to private sector involvement in the water sector.
Governments and development banks turn to private firms because they possess more
technical and practical experience, which will lead to a more efficient management of the
waterworks. In addition, depending on the privatisation agreement, some companies will
have the added incentive to upgrade the infrastructure using newer technology that will save
on costs and limit water leaks that translate into lower O&M costs. Finally, the issue of
pricing is central to the question of financial access to water. Ostrom's theory does not go
into this issue further than to discuss capacity building and user participation in creating the
rules of access. Pricing and willingness to pay for water are areas that are governed more by a
13
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combination of national policy and neoclassical economics. The issue of affordability is a
reoccurring theme throughout this thesis and is discussed at length in chapter 4.
2.2 Empirical Methodology
The information in this thesis has been derived primarily from a literature review, including
other students' case studies, as well as interviews with members of Carl Bro, working on
behalf of the South African Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). The
combination of background reading, critical review of standard PSP agreements, IWRM
policy implementation structure and interviews will make it possible to recommend a series
of criteria, which could be used in future PSP agreements.
The objective of this thesis is to question the opportunities and constraints under which
private sector participation is both feasible and can, to a large extent, contribute to the
realisation of the MDGs. The guiding principle objective of this study is to suggest a new
approach for PSP arrangements which could address the issues of extending access to poor
areas, affordability, community participation and transparency and finding the appropriate
role of the regulator by integrating and operating by many of the principles of IWRM. This
necessitates that water be treated both as an economic good and a social good, as laid out in
the Dublin principles. Following the Dublin conference, IWRM principles were developed to
include both the natural system and human system (these concepts will be discussed in
chapters 3 and 4). These systems take into account many of the social aspects of water
management. The following diagram illustrates the guiding methodology of this thesis; that a
successful strategy to privatisation can be found when IWRM is combined with PSP.
Within the framework of this thesis there are four primary areas of focus which have proven
to be problematic for PSP and IWRM alike: 1) extending water access and services to
marginal areas, 2) making water affordable, while not undercutting the value and cost of
providing water services, 3) including community participation when appropriate combined
with increased policy transparency from the water authority and 4) defining the role and
responsibilities of the public water regulator in relation to the private water utility operator.
These four areas form the framework within which aspects of PSP and IWRM can be
combined in a way that maximises the benefit to poor people lacking water access. As
previously mentioned in section 1.5 the selection of these four focus areas was the result of
careful consideration and recommendations of the literature as well as the outcome of the
case studies. In particular, Gleick, Wood, Johnstone and Gutierrez (et. al.) have highlighted
these four problem areas, as both interesting and problematic on the basis of extensive
research and case studies.14 These four focus areas have deepened my understanding of the
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issues at stake in water management and the importance of balancing the social and economic
values of water and applying appropriate institutional arrangements to PSP agreements. The
two desk studies also highlight the importance of these issues to stakeholders and the urgent
need to create solutions, directed towards these areas that adequately address the needs of the
stakeholders.
2.3 Analysis of the working questions
As previously mentioned, the four areas of extending access to marginal areas, water
affordability, community participation and transparency and state regulation are the four
areas that will be used to evaluate the desk studies in chapter 4. These four areas are of
particular importance because they focus on issues at the heart of sustainable water
management, they also represent areas that have been difficult to integrate into water
projects. Each of these areas represents a challenge to the water authority as well as an
element of economic risk. They have been chosen because they represent areas, which have
proven to be difficult to integrate and achieve in both PSP and IWRM forms of water
management, as will be exemplified by the desk studies.
2.3.1 "How are the economic and social values of water reconciled
or accounted for when attempting to extend access to
marginal areas?"
This question is relevant because it identifies one of the main problems with PSP in the water
sector in regards to extending water services to areas where they are needed the most by
poorer residents. There are two main sub-issues that need to be addressed within this question
to understand root causes of this problem area: 1) the willingness and obligation of the
private utility to extend the network and 2) the regulators interest in enforcing or prioritising
the extension of access to these areas. Addressing the social and economic values of water in
a way that benefits poorer residents involves flexibility on behalf of the water utility and the
regulator.
Public authorities often decide to bring in a private water operator they do so with the goal of
improving and extending service to underserved areas -specifically poor areas. Poor areas
may lack basic water infrastructure, especially in peri-urban areas where water systems may
be difficult to set up because the housing is not planned or controlled and because there may
be no roads into such areas. This barrier is often cited by privatised utilities as a major barrier
in extending the network to these areas. In addition, extending water services to these areas
presents a great deal of risk for companies, while operating by standard business principles,
Available at: http://www.wateraid.org/in_depth/policy_and_researchyprivate_sector_participation/default.asp
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may discover that conventional definitions of real estate and land owners may not apply to
the special situation of a marginal area.16 Another reason companies may be reluctant to
extend access to water services is that residents in these areas lack political power and
representation to demand water service because they are unable to pay for the full price of
water. (The issue of affordability is mentioned here to establish the interconnectedness of
the four problem areas however, this issue will be addressed in more detail in the next
section.) For private operators, investing in these types of areas is not an attractive investment
opportunity. They have no guarantee that they will be able to recoup their investment because
of the community's inability to pay for the service. Moreover, the initial cost of laying pipes
and connecting these areas to the central water works is a major project in itself. In some
cases, companies have laid the pipes above ground to save on costs but this solution leaves
the pipes vulnerable to illegal tapping. For example, this matter was addressed explicitly in
the La Paz-El Alto agreement in Bolivia in which extending water services to underserved
areas was one of the specific objectives of a concession agreement.
The issue of extending access to marginal areas may become political issue for the public
regulator. In many cases extending access to poor communities means extending access to
informal settlements, that are not officially recognised by the municipality and where
residents do not possess the same land rights. Municipalities may not be interested in the idea
of extending access to these areas because extending access to basic services legitimises the
presence of people on the land. Addressing the social and economic considerations of
extending access to marginal areas involves flexibility on behalf of the water utility and the
regulator. Poor, marginal communities present a special challenge to water utilities because
they may not be able to rely on standard planning tools or schematics for extending the water
network into these types of areas. People residing in these areas do have a right to water
access and stand to benefit the most from increased access to water services. Increased access
should be combined with an educational initiative explaining the hygienic use of the services
and basic operations and maintenance that can be performed by members of the community.
Community involvement in the decision-making process as well as basic maintenance will be
explored in the context of IWRM later in this paper. Although the potential benefits of water
access seem obvious, private utilities may question the ability of marginal area residents to
pay and also have concerns about technical issues such as metering and bill collection.
Chapter 4 will delve more deeply into the issue of reconciling the economic and social values
of water.
2.3.2 "What is the most effective method of making water services
affordable for the poorest citizens?"
The issue of the cost of water, both for the company providing the service and the consumer
is a determining factor in the equity of water allocation and distribution. In chapter 4, the
issues of water price, value and tariff systems will be reviewed in detail. The following
chapter will present an overview of the different types of PSP options as well as the types of
services that can be privatised. From the description of the relevant forms of PSP, it will
become clear that billing and the collection of payment is a focus of PSP agreements.
16
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Especially in concessions, private operators need to collect payment to cover their costs and
pay off the initial investment. In some cases, this leads to prices were increased shortly after
the privatisation agreement took force. Water prices may rise due to a number of mitigating
factors including, cost recovery, economic efficiency and social equality. One of the main
arguments for PSP is that it will promote a reduction in water prices. This certainly may
happen over the long term after greater efficiency and upgraded equipment have reduced
overall costs which may then be passed on to the user. This might, however, take many years
to implement successfully. In the short term, what many anti-privatisation groups fear is that
PSP automatically leads to increased prices because private firms are guided by a profit
motive. Gleick points out that mixed results have occurred and that there may be significant
price increases for some groups while the overall price remains the same for a majority of
users. Experience and studies have shown that poor users are willing to pay for water
services, but willingness to pay is not absolute and it is difficult to pinpoint how much
individuals are willing to pay because they need the water to survive. Increases in tariffs to
promote increased conservation and demand management should coincide with visible
improvements in service to make them more socially acceptable. Sharp increases in prices
may cause consumers to turn against the water provider, as in Cochabamba. Chapters 4 and 6
consider the most appropriate method for pricing water delivered to poor areas. Affordability
also relates back to the issue of reconciling the social and economic values of water. One of
the guiding principles of IWRM is valuing water as an economic good. This has led to the
debate about appropriateness of passing the supply costs on to poorer consumers. This
principle is also the subject of heated debate regarding the value of water and the
involvement of the private sector because private utilities are more likely to institute a tariff
system that includes full cost recovery as opposed to public utilities.1 This issue will be
discussed in more depth in chapters 3 and 4.
2.3.3 "In what way could community participation in water decision-
making improve transparency and influence both the water
authority and the water regulator?"
The issue of a lack of representation and of having no voice in decisions concerning water
allocation is due to the fact that in PSP arrangements poor people are seen exclusively as
recipients of aid and development rather than as active participants and contributors.19
Community involvement in decision-making has repeatedly been referred to as a prerequisite
for sustainable development and is one of the main tenants of IWRM (which will be
discussed in the next chapter). Each community within the same water service area may
represent a new challenge to the water services provider and may require a customised
solution. In many cases, the same problems that led to the government's decision to switch
from a public waterworks to a PSP approach are never fully addressed and lead to similar
problems for the private operator. These issues include: 1) lack of access to the contract; 2) in
cases where the contract is available failure to translate it into the local language; 3) lack of
ownership - in peri-urban areas residents may not feel they can demand access as the land
they occupy is not an officially recognized residential area; and 4) locating waterpoints. This
highlights the need for appropriate community input in water allocation and improvement of
18
 Rogers, P. et al., "Water as a social and economic good: how to put the principle into practice". TAC
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services. As a result of the South African desk study, I have concluded that appropriate
participation should be voluntary and should not be demanded by either the State or
municipal regulator or the private company. In South Africa participation in the creation of
Catchment Management Areas (CMAs) is technically voluntary but, if an area lacks diverse
participants plans to create local agencies to manage water in the area never receive
government approval. This process slows progress towards improving the overall quality of
service to residents in that area. It is however, a criteria put in place by the government to
redress past inequities of water allocation during the time of Apartheid. This type of
participatory approach relates back to Ostrom's recommendations for institutional
arrangements appropriate for CPRs. The CMAs' main function is to manage or regulate local
water resources through a participatory approach. In this case, feedback from local consumers
is used to establish their water supply needs, critique current systems of management and
assist the regulator or water provider in establishing access rules that they agree upon and
follow. Rules may include agreement on appropriate tariff structures and delivery methods.
In many cases, the water authority chooses waterpoints without the assistance of community
members, which is an example of how they are cut out of decisions that will affect them on a
daily basis. Without adequate consultation with the local community, the long-term
sustainability of water initiatives is questionable. When the water pump or latrine breaks
down local community members may not know who has responsibility for fixing the broken
devise. If a part needs to be replaced or the problem is more complex, the community itself
will have to contact an outside party to come in and fix the devise. Had the water provider
included local people in developing the agreement and educated them about the maintenance
of these services, the community could take a more active role in addressing problems when
they occur instead of being completely dependent on outside expertise. Active involvement
and capacity building in the building process is extremely important for promoting a sense of
ownership and responsibility within the community and leads to the long term sustainability
of waterworks projects. In addition to the technical aspects of water infrastructure, the water
operator should also educate the community in the proper use and maintenance of water
pumps and latrines so that they can reap the full health benefits of water services.20
2.3.4 What is the appropriate role of the regulator? Are there some
functions that should always remain in public hands under
privatisation?
This two-part working question identifies an issue that is sometimes over looked by anti-
privatisation crusaders; privatisation involves a detailed negotiation between the private
company and the public regulator. The transition from utility operator to regulator is equally
as important as the transition period from public to private utility control. The regulator
decides upon whether to privatise, the technicalities of the bidding process and makes the
final decision about what services to privatise. As a result of the desk studies I have
concluded that a regulator's first priority is to look after the best interests of the public, to
ensure that the needs of the poorest citizens are being met, and to regulate the water harvested
from both surface and groundwater sources to maintain environmental integrity. This may
entail publicly subsidised basic water for people under a certain income level via a lifeline
tariff or by guaranteeing basic free water as has been done in South Africa. The
categorisation of goods presented earlier in this chapter argues that public goods should be
20
 Ibid p. 17
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regulated by public institutional arrangements. This is due to the nature of public goods as
both public goods and social goods. The types of services that can be privatised under a
privatisation agreement include several services that can be controlled through a combination
of public or private institutional arrangements. This is one of the reasons why it has proven
difficult to transition from public to private control. The introduction of a private entity also
forces the role of the regulator, which is always publicly controlled, to become more visible. I
will argue that under privatisation there are certain services that should always remain in the
public domain due to their character as a public good.
Regardless of the risks and the bad press regarding privatisation agreements, privatisation
presents an opportunity that cannot be available if the water utility remains in public hands or
reverts to a cooperative arrangement. Privatisation forces the public regulator to define its
role in relation to the utility, now that it is no longer responsible for the daily operation and
maintenance of the utility. Under privatisation, the public regulator can exercise control of
water quality, stipulate specific areas where water access needs to be extended and be
consulted on changes to the tariff structure. The power balance between the regulator and the
utility operator should be based on the terms outlined in the contract, where specific targets
for improvements or changes in service are outlined and the operator and regulator are held
accountable to the terms of the contract. This requires that the operator be allowed a certain
degree of autonomy, as discussed in Ingram and Kessides, where the regulator lays down the
guidelines and the operator is responsible for implementation, free from micromanagement
from the regulator.21 The new power dynamic between the regulator and the utility could also
promote greater accountability and transparency, as there now exists a clearer border between
the responsibilities of the public regulator and the private operator. Prior to privatisation, the
state acted as both regulator and utility operator, which meant that executing plans for major
changes in the tariff structure, extending the service area and even repairing the existing
structure may have had a difficult path to follow due to bureaucracy or a lack of financial
resources. Privatisation provides the technical knowledge and funding for following through
with major changes to the existing network and defines a way of doing business. This is also
why the expectations and specific needs of the service area should be discussed explicitly
prior to finalising the contract, during the transition period and on a regular basis for the
duration of the contract.
2.4 Delimitations
There are other issues relevant to the discussion of improving PSP agreements including the
corruption of government and company officials, political pressure from interest groups in
water management, and the allocation decision-making process. It is far beyond the scope of
this study to delve into the complex relationships and politics that may accompany
privatisation of a utility. This study will focus on transparency in the context of community
participation in the decision-making process and transparency in the bidding process and
terms of the contract.
In addition, there is the moral issue of the multinational water utility profiting from the sale
local water. Although inextricably related to the PSP discussion and affordability, the moral
21
 Ingram, G and Kessides, C, 1994. "Infrastructure for Development" in Finance & Development vol. 31 no. 3,
September, p.20
21
issue will not be addressed directly because it is also not central to the discussion presented in
this study.
Finally, the role of international finance institutions, mining for groundwater, the
privatisation of water resources, upstream-downstream user responsibility, the polluter-pays
principle in relation to cleaning wastewater, although equally as important as the four focus
areas, will not be explicitly dealt with in this study as examination of these issues is not
necessary to answer the problem formulation.
2.5 Choice of Desk Studies
I will use two desk studies to illustrate the progression in development towards a more
holistic form of water governance. They are referred to as desk studies as opposed to case
studies because I did not conduct primary field research to obtain information presented in
this thesis. Instead, information was obtained through a literature review and interviews.
These two desk studies were chosen for a variety of reasons. The Cochabamba case has been
well documented from a variety of political standpoints and is generally referred to in most of
the literature on PSP. Since economic and personal commitments prevented me from
conducting any primary research it was important that I chose cases that were well researched
and that had been carefully analysed by authors who were both pro-PSP and anti-PSP. The
Cochabamba case is referred to so often in the literature, that it functions almost as the first
introduction to the issues at stake in PSP and represents a rare case where the water users, not
the regulator, were so dissatisfied with various aspects of the agreement that they succeeded
in ending the contract and forcing the Bechtel-owned AdT, out of Cochabamba. This case is
very useful for examining a PSP agreement where economic principles of cost recovery are
applied but the community is not consulted in how they should be applied. In addition the
bidding process was rushed, the principles of transparency were not upheld and the role of the
regulator remained somewhat unclear. Finally, the public outcry after implementation of the
new tariff system demonstrates the necessity of involving consumers in water management
initiatives. The Cochabamba case provides a good backdrop for recommendations for greater
community participation, affordability, transparency, extended access and regulation.
Cochabamba also represents one of the first attempts to privatise water management and has
been held up by many groups as a classic example of all that can go wrong when privatisation
is implemented too quickly.
The second desk study can be divided into two sections. The first concerns the
implementation of IWRM in South Africa, specifically with respect to community
participation and the creation of Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) in three Water
Management Areas (WMAs). The second section concerns the promise of Free Basic Water
for all citizens in South Africa. South Africa has made some ambitious commitments to
improving water access and to drastically changing the way water is managed and allocated.
South Africa has made a commitment to implement IWRM on a national scale, they have
also declared that access to water is a human right in its constitution as well as ratified a great
deal of water related legislation. The legislative aspect of South Africa's water policy
represents a unique and well-formulated plan for sustainable water management throughout
the country. Many problems remain however implementing and fulfilling the changes
necessary to carry out the original intent of the legislation.
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The first section of the desk study was accomplished through direct contact with Carl Bro, a
Danish water and environmental company that is currently working as the lead consultant on
IWRM in three WMAs funded through Danida. Direct contact with members of the project
staff allowed for candid answers to my questions about the success of their project. In
addition, I had the opportunity to review a wealth of internal Carl Bro and Danida documents
that track the progress of the project. The main drawback to this portion of the South Africa
desk study is that in April, my primary contact left Carl Bro, documents related to the case,
"disappeared" from the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) website. As a
result, the most recent documents in my possession are from 2003.1 am aware that the project
was going through some flux at this time. Although the data is not as recent as I would prefer,
the first three years of project implementation are still very useful because they represent the
guiding assumptions of the project and initial difficulties encountered by the project team.
Since these assumptions and difficulties might also occur in other settings, they exemplify
fundamental problems associated with implementing IWRM. This portion of the desk study
directly addresses the issues of community participation, transparency, defining the role of
the regulator and the issue of finding the right institutional arrangement for the long-term
sustainability of the CMAs.
The second section of the desk study briefly describes the difficulty the South African
government has had implementing a policy of Free Basic Water for all. This policy is very
interesting and relevant because it guarantees a basic water requirement to all residents in
South Africa and directly addresses the issue of extending access and affordability.
Information from this case has been gathered from DWAF documents, correspondence with
Eddie Cottle, from the Danish NGO, South Africa Contact and the findings of another
TekSam group that conducted a three month field study in South Africa specifically on the
effectiveness of the Free Basic Water policy in South Africa.
Although these two desk studies represent two very different perspectives and approaches to
water management, the same basic issues have proven problematic in both scenarios.
Comparing and contrasting these approaches will lead to suggestions and analysis of the best
institutional arrangements and the conditions and opportunities of combining PSP with
aspects of IWRM in future projects. These cases are also useful in presenting two different
institutional approaches to water management, desirability and willingness for public
participation and the need for increased transparency and capacity building in both PSP and
IWRM projects.
2.5.1 Brief description of the Bolivian desk study
The case of PSP in Cochabamba, Bolivia is held up by anti-privatisation groups as a prime
example of why both social and economic good aspects of water need to be addressed when
implementing a privatisation agreement. In 1999, the Bolivian government privatised the
water system of Cochabamba, partly because it acquiesced to pressures from the World Bank
to make structural changes to its economy. The government granted a 40-year concession
agreement to a water consortium led by and Italian company (Water Ltd.) and a US based
construction company, (Bechtel Enterprise Holdings). Within days of the agreement's initial
implementation, the new water management drastically modified the rate structure and rolled-
in previously accumulated debt. As a result, many residents either received, or anticipated
increases in their water bills by as much as 100%. In addition, water collection required the
purchase of permits, which threatened the poorest residents' access to water from communal
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standpipes.22 These actions spurred the residents to organise and protest the privatisation
agreement. The unrest was so great that the Bolivian army was deployed to control the unrest
after martial law was declared on April 8, 2000. This whole episode caused the deaths of 9
residents. The Bolivian government has since rescinded the agreement and is awaiting trial at
the World Bank's International Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, where
Bechtel is suing the government of Bolivia for close to $25 million dollars for its losses.23
Studying this case is important because it pinpoints the problems, which arise when PSP is
implemented hastily and without appropriate measures for public participation. This
privatisation agreement neither took into consideration the needs and concerns of the
residents nor the financial obligations of running the water service and repaying debt.
2.5.2 Brief description of the South Africa Desk Study
The second desk study will begin by describing a new conceptual approach regarding water
governance. The water management system in South Africa focuses on Integrated Water
Resource Management and represents a departure from the approach in Bolivia. The two
issues at the centre of this desk study are the South African government's attempt to create
Catchment Management Agencies which are based on public participation and a new policy
of guaranteeing free basic water access, amounting to 25 litres per person per day. Although a
private Danish company, Carl Bro, is acting as a consultant on this project, the issue of PSP is
not the most important issue in this desk study. This case study is useful because it illustrates
an attempt to implement IWRM on a national scale, which involves many stakeholders as
well as the basic free water policy. IWRM has been held up by many water researchers and
the UN as the best possible example of water management this desk study will demonstrate
that implementation of such a policy presents a variety of new challenges and that DWAF has
been forced to question some of its earlier assumptions. The South African example differs
from the Bolivian example in that it focuses on a State centred approach to water allocation,
which is based on the tenants of IWRM. In South Africa, as opposed to Bolivia, the law is
very specific about the role of private entities, as well as government regulation of privatised
water services. Although the South African scenario avoids the more obvious mistakes made
in Bolivia, in both cases, the way in which IWRM was integrated in each water management
area required a great deal of public participation - something which has not been forthcoming
in many areas. Together these two examples illustrate depict what happens when PSP is
implemented in a specific context. They provide further information about what kind of PSP
is best suited to deliver water services to poor communities, in light of the MDGs and what
criteria should be included in PSP contracts to help ensure that the mistakes of Bechtel and
others are not repeated.
2.6 Summary
This chapter has presented the theoretical and empirical methodology of this thesis. In
addition, the working questions were analysed and a brief introduction to the two desk studies
was presented. The next chapter will present the primary aspects of the two approaches to
water management that are the focus of this thesis, PSP and IWRM.
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Chapter 3
Understanding Private Sector Participation
and IWRM
This chapter will expand and analyse the current approaches of PSP and IWRM and discuss
their strengths and weaknesses. This chapter will also address the relevance and validity of
private sector participation in the water sector. Specifically, I will explore the underlying
issues of the privatisation debate more deeply and review the problems that have occurred
with public run utilities that has led to the need to consider private solutions. Some of the
most common forms of privatisation will be considered along with their implications for the
role of the public regulator with reference to specific case studies. In addition, the conceptual
approach of IWRM will be presented and analysed.
3.1 Private Sector Participation
Privatisation is a growing phenomenon in developing and industrialised countries because it
addresses problems of inefficiency and funding. This is one reason why privatisation
agreements in developing countries are related to loans from development finance
institutions. The increasing rate of privatisation along with continuing attempts to privatise
public utilities despite past failures makes this area of inquiry extremely pertinent.
Privatisation, whether at the behest of an international finance institution or through a direct
investment proposal from a multinational utility will definitely continue. Therefore, it is
necessary to conduct research to achieve a better understanding of problems with past
implementation and why some concessions have gone sour in order to learn how the
privatisation of water utilities can benefit the poor.
The privatisation of water services by multinational companies is not a new phenomenon; it
has been around in various forms for about 10-15 years1. Common types of privatisation such
as small-scale water vendors, investor-owned utilities and other methods of distribution have
been in use in many countries.2 The nature of privatisation changed when large multinational
utilities began undertaking large projects, in part due to the promotion of private participation
from donor and grant agencies during the International Drinking Water and Sanitation
Decade from 1981-1990. The World Bank in particular, actively supported the notion that
1
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private companies were the most appropriate institutions to take over inefficient and
malfunctioning public water utilities that were unable to provide water services at an
acceptable level. Increased privatisation, combined with aggressive reform of national water
policies of many developing nations included PSP as a central element, in keeping with
World Bank structural adjustment programs. Although privatisation in its many forms has
become more common, it is important to remember that privatisation (in some form) provides
less than 10% of the world's population with drinking water.3
3.2 The Debate
The new debate surrounding private sector involvement is a response to recent developments
regarding the extent of privatisation schemes, undertaken by multinational companies as well
as growing public awareness and concern about the problems which have been associated
with PSP schemes. The issue of PSP has come to the fore for three main reasons: 1) many
public utilities have been unable to meet people's basic need for water for, 2) multinational
water companies including Vivendi (now Veolia environment) and Ondeo (which have
operations in over 120 countries ) and have taken over a larger share of water delivery
services and 3) there have been several highly publicised failed privatisation efforts which
have generated a great deal of controversy.5
During the Third World Water Conference in Kyoto, Japan, in March 2003, a dialogue group
was formed to discuss issues concerning PSP in the water sector. Upon the conclusion of the
Forum, each dialogue group from a broad range of themes was asked to provide a joint
statement outlining the issues discussed. The rift between the two groups of participants
within the private participation theme was so extreme, that they were unable to come to
consensus. For the first time ever the co-coordinators, the World Water Council and the
Council of the Canadians, issued separate reports outlining their very disparate views for the
future of private involvement in the water sector. The debate boils down to this: the World
Water Council believes that it will require the expertise, coordination and cooperation of all
sectors, (private, state and non-profit) to realize greater access to drinking water and
sanitation services - including the human right to water. The Council of Canadians believes
that the commodification of water is fundamentally wrong. Water should be treated as a
social - and not as an economic good - and should only be controlled and developed by local
and national authorities. The conflict between these groups sums up the debate about whether
private involvement in the management of water utilities can be positive. Despite differences
of opinion on the privatisation of water utilities, the two groups did agree that: access to
water is a human right, water resources are a common good to be controlled by governments
on behalf of their citizens and that governments are ultimately accountable for providing
drinking water and sanitation access to their citizens.6
The debate centres around doubts of whether or not a water system regulated by market
forces can address social needs and meet social - not necessarily economic- objectives. These
3
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concerns raise the issue of a need for a non-market oriented mechanism that can balance the
social, economic and environmental dimensions of water allocation and distribution. Later in
this chapter the institutional mechanism of Integrated Water Resource Management will be
presented as a means of integrating the social, economic and environmental aspects of water
management into forms of PSP. Another problem with PSP is that it commonly occurs in
countries where the public sector is weak which creates an unbalanced power dynamic
between a strong, financially stable private operator and a weak, unorganised public
authority.7 In these cases, the private company is seen as a threat and faces public opposition,
as in Bolivia. The following section will go more in depth about the main drivers of
privatisation.
3.3 Drivers of Privatisation
According to E.S. Savas, there are five main factors or "drivers" which pressure governments
into considering privatisation:
1) Societal - the belief that privatisation can help meet unmet basic water needs
2) Commercial- the belief that more business is better
3) Financial- the belief that the private sector can mobilise capital faster and better than
the public sector
4) Ideological- the belief that smaller government is better
5) Pragmatic- the belief that competent, efficient water-system operations require PSP.8
The societal driver reflects one of the most commonly cited advantages of PSP, which is that
private companies bring in managerial and technical experience which may not be locally
available. In many cases the societal driver combined with the pragmatic driver address the
fact that in some countries, private companies are brought in because the current public utility
is unable to meet basic water needs due to lack of funding, inefficiency, insufficient technical
knowledge or corruption. A private company may be brought in because the public utility has
not been able to keep up with increasing service demands for an expanded network.9 In
Mexico City four private companies have been invited in to run the water system because the
government regards PSP as a "key reform measure to solving the country's water and
sanitation problems."10 Since the privatisation effort, consumer databases have been created,
which have greatly improved billing efficiency, meters have been installed and a policy of
cost recovery has been implemented. These improvements have led to 100km of the network
has been refurbished, 20,000 service connections have been substituted and 72.4% of the bills
are being collected.11
In addition, governments may be more critical of the actions and business practices of a
private company than they would of a state run entity. The financial driver addresses the issue
of the ability of private companies to mobilise capital quickly. Water-supply projects are very
capital intensive, building and repairing infrastructure. The Framework for Action which was
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one of the outcomes of the Second World Water Forum in 2000, stated that "an additional
$105 billion annually, for the next 25 years would be needed from private sources to meet
basic water needs".1 The involvement of private companies allows governments to distance
themselves from the financial realities of water service delivery. In many cases the price of
water is so heavily subsidised that the actual supply-cost is not passed on to the user. To help
offset the inevitable deficit, many governments institute a system of subsidies and tariffs that
help large water consumers, such as agriculture, so that lower-income segments of the society
must disproportionately pay for water. Private companies are more likely to pass on the
actual cost of water supply to the user which often results in price hikes (as was seen in
Bolivia). This alternate pricing structure ensures that the investment is paid back and that the
O&M costs of the water system are self-sustaining. Finally, by contracting a private company
to provide water services, the government, specifically elected officials, avoid the unpleasant
issue of being the ones to raise water prices; they can pass that unpopular problem on to the
company.13
There are several problems with such an approach to privatisation. In the synthesis report on
PSP's ability to benefit the poor, prepared by the two British NGOs Wateraid and Tearfund,
the authors pointed out that although PSP addresses many of the problems experienced by
Southern governments in terms of bad financial management, lack of staff experience and
little consultation with civil society, PSP cannot ameliorate other equally important problems.
For instance, PSP will not automatically resolve efficiency problems if the underlying cause
of the inefficiency is corruption. In addition, if the problem is lack of technical and
managerial expertise, if all the responsibility is taken on by a private company the ability to
shift operations back to the public sector, for example at the end of a concession agreement,
will be next to impossible if there has been no provision for public sector capacity building.
Finally, if a great deal of capital must be spent on repairing existing infrastructure two
consequences will follow: 1) those that already have access to water will be the immediate
beneficiaries of the service and 2) underserved, poor communities will have a much lower
priority for access and consequently will have to wait longer to be connected to water
services.14 The PSP initiative in Mexico city has led to substantial improvement in the
network, however, the report from Wateraid reveals that unpaid bills, still account for over !4
of the total amount. Lost revenue from unpaid bills is cited as a major barrier to extending the
network into poorer areas. 5
These problems bring up important issues about the acceptability and appropriateness of PSP
when considering the social and economic trade-offs involved in PSP contracts. The
effectiveness of the State as a regulator and its ability to transition from utility operator to
regulator is an equally important consideration in measuring and predicting the success of
PSP agreements. The drivers of privatisation can also be viewed from a more theoretical
perspective, as described by Ostrom. The drivers can also be interpreted as types of
transaction and information costs which include the time and resources to undertake long-
term planning, stakeholder consultation, monitoring and acquiring the technical information
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needed to manage the resource.16 Privatisation occurs as a result of the public regulator
deciding that the transaction costs are too high for the public utility and that a private utility
would be better equipped to operate the utility. The following section will discuss the reasons
why water utilities are privatised in depth.
3.4 Why Privatisation?
Water has traditionally been the domain of the public sector for two main reasons: 1) the
public good nature of water and the fact that it is a basic need for life and health and 2) the
monopolistic nature of water management.17 Private sector involvement until the late 1980s,
early 1990s was considered inappropriate. In recent years, however, a large increase in the
involvement of the private sector has occurred due to a combination of a lack of public
funding for improving and expanding the network and migration and population growth in
urban areas.18
"In many developing countries, the combination of rapidly growing urban populations along
with a reduction in assistance for WSS (Water Supply and Sanitation) services from
international development agencies and decades of poor public management of WSS, mean
that public sources of finance are no longer able to bear the costs of rehabilitation and
expansion. "!9
A 1997 survey of State officials in the US revealed that the top seven reasons why
governments consider privatising are: "1) cost savings, 2) greater political support for
privatisation, 3) more flexibility and less red tape, 4) faster implementation, 5) lack of state
personnel and expertise, 6) increased innovation and 7) higher quality of service".20 These
issues are commonly cited throughout the literature as the main reasons why municipalities
decide to privatise or development banks prefer privatisation as opposed to a direct loan.
Within the context of this study, privatisation is used as an alternative to a continuation of a
stagnant public utility. Due to the intrinsic nature of water as fulfilling a basic need, unlike
any other utility, it is imperative that new solutions are sought to improve access to water
services. Privatisation is not meant as a solution to all of the above mentioned problems but
as an alternative to the current public utility which, given the right balance of the social and
economic aspects of water could improve access to water services for marginal communities.
Privatisation has traditionally taken an economic management approach to PSP agreements
where social issues of inequity in distribution and allocation of services are addressed
through economic means, namely via cross-subsidies built into a tariff structure. This
method, which may seem effective on the surface, cannot always address the needs of
unserved areas, which present a certain degree of investment risk. Community participation
and defining the role of the regulator could assist in increasing transparency and
16
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accountability of the utility, regulator and consumers, creating an environment that would
minimize the risks involved in privatisation.
3.4.1 Public or Private?
The choice of whether a public or a private solution to operational or managerial problems
with the water authority is the more appropriate solution for problems with the utility is not a
clear-cut issue. Underlying issues of corruption, poor communication or funding are not
present in all public utilities. There are examples of both well functioning public utilities and
successful cooperative arrangements in both developing and industrial countries. In Botswana
and Togo, the water and sanitation services are publicly owned and operated.21 According to
Ingram and Kessides, they have been successful because they have been given relative
autonomy and have been free from government interference. The water utility is run by basic
business principles and is held accountable through performance agreements and by adhering
to the same accounting and labour laws as private businesses.22 The success of the publicly
run utility in Botswana and Togo is dependent on a good definition of the expectations and
responsibilities of both utility operator and the regulator. Common performance goals are set
jointly by both parties after which the regulator holds the utility accountable to the agreed
upon improvements in service, stipulated in the contract. This option is not seen often in
developing countries because it is dependent on a consistent level of support from the
government. 23 Although this represents a "good" example of a publicly run utility, it is still
vulnerable to changes in within the government and its success depends on the
implementation of good business practices and an understanding between the operator and
the regulator of performance expectations.
Although Kessides presents an example of an efficient and well functioning publicly owned
water utility, many public utilities struggle with the same problem of meeting the basic needs
of their community while considering the various values of water. For example, in Chennai,
India municipal authorities cannot supply enough water to the residents of the city through
the main network. This is due partly to the degradation of the freshwater resources locally
available and rapid population growth. There is not enough water available to supply the
population, so a project of harvesting rainwater has been implemented.24 Surface water, from
local rivers, is very polluted and years of ground water extraction has yielded water from the
aquifer unsuitable for human consumption.25 In response to the constant situation of natural
scarcity, the city has water trucked in from 250 km. for distribution to unserved areas. The
municipal water supplier is unable to extend the network due to lack of capital, and even if
the network was extended, there is not enough water available to meet the growing needs of
the population. Due to the complex nature of the water supply problem in Chennai, were the
municipality to decide to privatise the utility, they would need to specify and prioritise
performance criteria from the outset.
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The issue of a setting creating specific performance criteria is one of the defining
characteristics of private utilities. Public utilities create targets based on a political agenda for
improvements in service or as part of consistent upgrades and refurbishments of services
(metering, network etc.). Private utilities, however, are not subject to the same kind of
political pressure as public utilities and may not have a long-term interest in improving
meters, or extending access to certain areas unless it will positively effect their budget or
unless it is specifically outlined in the contract. PSP may not be appropriate in all contexts
however, there are certain criteria, specifically, regarding extending the network to areas that
still lack access and targets for house or community connections within pre-specified areas,
that, must be met by a certain date. These criteria should be presented by the public water
regulator and accepted by the private utility, prior to the acceptance of the privatisation
agreement. The extensiveness of the pre-determined performance criteria is dependent on the
type of privatisation (BOOT, concession etc.) because that dictates, to a certain degree, the
types of services that are privatised as well as the length of the privatisation contract. For
example, the demands of the regulator at the outset of a 20-to-50 year concession agreement
differ from the milestones determined at the outset of a management contract, which typically
lasts for 3 to 5 years. The characteristics of the different types of privatisation will be
reviewed in the next section. The issue of performance criteria dealt with under all of the
working questions, however, the issue of which sub-services to privatise falls squarely into
the fourth focus area concerning the role of the regulator.
3.5 Types of Privatisation
As mentioned in the introduction there are several types of privatisation agreements. This
section will review the most common ones. There are eleven types of services that can be
privatised. They include:
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These eleven services can all be privatised individually or as part of a larger privatisation
agreement. They can also be combined under different types of privatisation agreements, the
most common of which will be presented in this section. Although each of these eleven items
can be the subject of individual privatisation agreements, (ie: the municipality contracts a
company to install meters or collect bills) other services such as monitoring and enforcement
of water quality are responsibilities that should be assumed by the public regulator and not
included in any privatisation agreements. In addition, pricing decisions and decisions
regarding the design of capital improvements should be taken together with the public
regulator and in consultation with community representatives. Just because so many types of
related services can be privatised separately or rolled into a concession agreement, does not
mean that transferring the responsibility for some of these services from public to private
hands is always advisable. The discussion of public regulators and their responsibilities will
be taken up at length in chapter 5.27
Once again, it is important to remember that PSP is not synonymous with full-on
privatisation of water services, water resources or both. The following figure represents the
continuum of private involvement with water characterised by the nature of the management
and by who owns the assets (ie: water resource, infrastructure etc.).
This illustration represents the variety of privatisation options available to governments who
may want to privatise certain services, while maintaining control and ownership over the
utility. The types of privatisation that are most relevant for this study are concession
agreements, Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) and its variations and operations and
management contracts. These options have been singled out because they are the most
common types of privatisation in developing countries.28 These privatisation options can be
divided into two groups: those where the private ownership of assets is limited and those
where there is partial or total private ownership of the assets. Group One includes PSP
27
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options in which ownership of the utility and natural resources remains with the government
or the public sector, as is the case with management contracts, and concessions. Group Two
consists of PSP arrangements where some or all of the assets are transferred to the private
company involved. These options include: BOOT (Build Own Operate Transfer) and its
variations- BOT (Build Operate Transfer) and BOO (Build Own Operate), Reverse BOOT.
(see below)
Under Group One, operation and management contracts the private company takes over the
day-to-day operations of the utility and acts on behalf of the public utility. This option is
usually selected when the quality of service from the main utility is poor or when accounting,
physical facilities or consumer records are not reliable or available.2 The contractor does not
get paid unless rates are collected from consumers. This creates an incentive for increased
productivity and again links payment to the quality of the service performed. The period of
management contracts ranges from 3 to 5 years and can be extended or converted into the
more intensive forms of PSP; represented in Group Two.
In a concession the private contractor has overall control of the utility for a long period of
time, usually 20 to 30 years. The overall length of time depends on the time needed for the
concessionaire to recoup its initial investment. The concessionaire is responsible for
operation, maintenance, billing, collection and upgrading equipment (due to the duration of
the agreement). "The advantage of combining responsibility for operations and investments
in the same entity is that it provides and incentive to the operator to make efficient investment
decisions, because their consequences will affect it directly. It also provides an incentive for
technological innovations, because the operator will benefit directly from any efficiency
improvements."30 At the end of a concession agreement all works and equipment are returned
to the public authority. The private operator is paid for its services directly by the consumer,
based on a price agreed upon in the contract. There is a larger degree of risk in this type of
PSP because a penalty can be levied against the private operator if it fails to provide service
to a certain area or if the quality of service is not acceptable, as defined in the contract.
Again, the second group of PSP options represents types of PSP that are more intense
meaning that the private operator owns a portion or all of the assets at some point during the
PSP agreement. BOOT contracts are not very common in the water and sanitation sector but
have been used extensively in the electricity and transportation sectors. l Essentially, the
private operator finances, builds, owns and operates a specific new facility or system. After a
period of time, specified in the contract, the ownership of the facility changes over to the
public authority. BOOT agreements, together with similar arrangements of BOO and BOT
represent a high level of risk for the private operator. Under a BOOT contract, the public
authority is responsible for determining the demand for service, which determines the size of
the facility and thereby the level of initial investment needed. BOOT agreements last as long
as is needed for the private company to recoup its investment. Problems occur when there is a
significant difference between estimated demand and real demand. Reverse BOOT
agreements pose less risk to private companies because the state builds the new facility and
then contracts the private company to operate it over a long period of time, which is usually
sufficient to cover the full investment costs. Reverse BOOT may become more popular in the
future because the private operator has more incentive to maintain the facility well and to
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upgrade systems as needed because of the expectation of full ownership at some point in the
future.
Depending on the context, the types of services that will be included in the privatisation
agreement and the institutional arrangements for public participation and regulatory
oversight, specific types of privatisation can be recommended. As mentioned in the previous
section, performance criteria that implements changes in tariff structure or significant repairs
and extension of the network will necessarily require a longer period of privatisation. Within
that period, the issue of what services to privatise and whether to "privatise" the entire utility,
as opposed to outsourcing certain services to private companies, such as billing or meter
installation. I will argue in later chapters that the institutional capacity of the regulator is the
factor that determines what kind of PSP option should be considered (if at all). In addition, I
will argue that certain services should remain in the public domain. Specifically, pricing
decisions and the monitoring of water quality (as it directly relates to public health), are
services that should remain under public control due to their nature as public goods.
3.5.1 Small-scale entrepreneurs - water vendors
Fully private small-scale entrepreneurs are often referred to as water vendors. They are
commonly found in areas where there is a low level of water service and sell water obtained
from a private or public utility or from their own water source - indirectly from the utility. In
some cases they have access to piped water themselves and collect and sell that water to other
users in their area who lack access to water services. Water vendors are most active in peri-
urban areas or in rural areas. Private vendors often inflate the price which is why poor people
pay more for water than wealthier people who own houses with direct connections to a water
supply. For example, in El Alto, Bolivia, following a concession agreement people with
private connections paid $2.20 per month for 10 cubic meters of water while those relying on
private vendors paid $35.00 for the same amount delivered by private vendors.32
3.6 Brief comparison of PSP options
In all of the above-mentioned PSP models every option is temporary. In all of the 3 models,
the goal of PSP is to promote efficiency, commercial viability and to introduce competition
between perspective operators in order to recover costs. Furthermore, performance based
compensation is a major factor that the private operator to achieve a high level of efficiency
in day to day operations. Despite their differences, with very few exceptions, all of the PSP
options mentioned above are temporary and ownership and management of the utility reverts
back to the state following the expiration of the contract. Thus PSP is generally a temporary
solution to water management problems occurring with the public utility. Unlike public
utilities, PSP introduces an element of competition between perspective water operators and
links efficiency with revenue to cover the investment. Finally, the only option which
stipulates direct penalties for failing to meet the objectives of the agreement is a concession
agreement, which has been one of the more popular and well publicised forms of PSP. Both
Manila, Philippines and Buenos Aires, Argentina have undergone concession agreements
which have, until recently been successful. Chapter 5 will review two examples of water
management, in order to examine their drivers, methods of operation and what problems they
32
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encountered. The success or failure of these two cases will be evaluated with regard to their
ability and willingness to 1) extend access to marginal areas, 2) make water affordable to all
3) involve the community in decisions concerning the project and disseminate information
about the project to the public and 4) how well the public regulator transitioned into its role.
The first case is the Bechtel - Bolivia case which was a 40 year BOT or concession contract,
this case represents the "first generation" of PSP agreements which were not especially good
at integrating the social, environmental and economic aspects of water management. The
second case on South Africa represents an evolution in thinking about water management
because the method of implementation is strictly based on IWRM. This case is very
interesting because South Africa is well known for its excellent water legislation and policies,
there have been several implementation problems which have slowed progress to such an
extent that many people have been left without access to water. The following sections will
present the conceptual background of IWRM.
3.7 IWRM
IWRM is an equitable and sustainable method for the management of water resources
requires a flexible, holistic approach, which is capable of responding to variations in the
hydrological cycle, changes in socio-economic needs and fluctuating priorities of political
regimes.33 Creating a water governance structure that is capable of taking into account both
the needs of the natural system and human needs for water that is also flexible enough to
respond to changes in state regulation and management structure presents a challenge to
public and private water authorities alike. Appropriate concern and attention to these aspects
of water management have been notably absent from the majority of water management
institutions, both at the national and international level.34 Traditional water management has
been dominated by a sector approach which has led to disjointed and uncoordinated
development and management of the resource. Specifically, drinking water and sanitation
services are generally part of a public health or infrastructure development, irrigation is part
of the department of agriculture, industry's needs are addressed under industrial allocation
and protection for the recreational use of lakes and beachfront areas fall under tourism.35 This
uncoordinated approach to water management has resulted in little to no communication or
means of moderating competition between sectors for water resources and has thereby
compounded the problem of understanding and communication between user groups, of
upstream-downstream resource constraints and of the need to deal with competing claims for
the same resource.
IWRM attempts to address these shortcomings in traditional water management by
addressing the needs of both the natural system and the human system. The needs of the
natural system are defined as ensuring that the resource is continually available and that the
quality of the water stays at a certain predetermined level so as not to jeopardise the ability of
the system to perform environmental services. The human system interacts with the natural
system by determining resource use and waste production.36 The Dublin principles are the
primary principles of IWRM and deal directly with the issue of treating water as both an
economic and social good.
33
 United Nations, 2003. Water for people, water for life. Barcelona: UNESCO and Berghahn Books. P.299
34
 Ibid
35
 GWP, 2003. "Poverty Reduction and IWRM" in TEC Background Papers No. 8, Sweden: Elanders Novum.
P.14
36
 Ibid
35
In 1992 at the International Conference on Water and the Environment, Dublin, the outcomes
of the conference included the Dublin Statement and the Conference Report, which outline
four guiding principles for water management at the global, national and local level. These
principles have changed the way many policy makers view water as a resource and have
sparked controversy.
Historically water has been treated as public good, a resource to which access cannot easily
be controlled and is free to all and that can be consumed by many users without limiting the
amount available to each user. Water occurs freely in nature and the ethos of water service
providers has been to increase supply, as long as consumers continue to increase their
demand for more of the resource. The Dublin principles counter this way of thinking by
introducing principles that address: the need to view water as a scarce resource which must
not be over stressed, the need for a participatory approach, with special attention to feedback
from women and minorities and finally, by declaring that water is an economic good.
3.8 The Dublin Principles
Principle 1: Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life,
development and the environment.
Since water sustains life, effective management of water resources demands a holistic approach,
linking social and economic development with protection of natural ecosystems. Effective
management links land and water users across the whole of a catchment area or ground water aquifer.
Principle 2: Water development and management should be based on a participatory
approach, involving users, planners and policy makers at all levels.
The participatory approach involves raising awareness of the importance of water among
policy-makers and the general public. It means that decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level,
with full public consultation and involvement of users in the planning and implementation of water
projects.
Principle 3: Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of
water.
This pivotal role of women as providers and users of water and guardians of the living
environment has seldom been reflected in institutional arrangements for the development and
management of water resources. Acceptance and implementation of this principle requires positive
policies to address women's specific needs and to equip and empower women to participate at all
levels in water resources programmes, including decision-making and implementation, in ways
defined by them.
Principle 4: Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be
recognized as an economic good.
Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human beings to have
access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic
value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource. Managing
water as an economic good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of
encouraging conservation and protection of water resources.37
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3.9 IWRM, The Dublin Principles, PSP and development
As previously mentioned, IWRM addresses aspects of water management which have been
neglected, specifically the issue of integrating the social and economic good aspects of water.
Principle 4 while recognising the economic value of water, clearly states that all humans have
the right to clean water at an affordable price. The tension between satisfying social good and
economic needs of society has consistently been one of the underlying problems complicating
attempts to manage and allocate water in a sustainable manner.
The literature consistently attests that, IWRM represents a model for best practice, because it
balances the need for consumer participation with a recognition of the monetary value of the
resource within a context that recognises the importance of water in both human and
ecosystem development. One of the problems of IWRM is that the definitions of value, cost
and stakeholder involvement are open to interpretation from both economic and
environmental perspectives. This means that policies and tariff systems that are considered
"socially sensitive" actually prioritise the economic value of water over the social need.
Examples of this situation will be presented in the desk studies in chapter 5.
3.10 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the debate over privatisation, the main drivers of privatisation and
has addressed the issue of whether privately or publicly run utilities are the best option for
extending water access to poor areas. This chapter has also reviewed the most common forms
of private participation and examined some of the shortcomings of privatisation schemes. In
addition, this chapter has introduced Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM),
which represents a newer approach to water governance. IWRM ties together water
management in a holistic way that reflects the social needs of people, the needs of the
environment in relation to the hydrological cycle and the economic needs which are a major
concern in water management.
The following chapter will go into more in depth about the economic and social goods
aspects of water and analyse them using the framework of Serageldin's triangles of
sustainable development. The chapter will address how the values are expressed through
pricing and tariff schemes. Finally, suggestions will be presented for ways in which aspects
of IWRM can be integrated into PSP so that the social, environmental and economic aspects
of water management are accounted for so that equity in water management and allocation
can be achieved.
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Chapter 4
The Problem of Valuing Water:
Considerations in Sustainable Water
Management
Water management has been traditionally characterized by supply side management, which
entails providing as much water as possible to the consumers that can pay for the service. As
indicated in the introduction, there is a new awareness about the way we conceptualise and
manage water as a good and the interplay between human consumption of water and the
natural resource, which serves as the source for our water. This chapter will discuss the
economic and social good aspects of water provision using the framework of Serageldin's
triangles that illustrate two competing views of sustainable development. Serageldin's
triangles are useful for examining the competing values of water. In addition, the two figures
represent two vastly different views of the same concept, sustainable development in a way
that is analogous to the two approaches of water management (PSP and IWRM) described in
the previous chapter. The two competing aspects of water have led to a lot of confusion over
how to manage and allocate water resources from both private and public water providers.
This chapter will describe, clarify and analyse the issues at stake when balancing the social
and economic aspects of water provision that lie at the heart of the debate over the
appropriateness of PSP.
4.1 Balancing the social and economic aspects of water
management
Ismail Seragelden, from the World Bank has created a framework for discussing and
analysing different approaches to sustainable development which illustrates the analogous to
the two views that have dominated water management. In addition, the figures assist in
discussing and analysing the need to balance the economic and social aspects of water. Using
the three aspects of sustainable development, Serageldin has created two triangles
representing 1) the objectives of sustainable development and 2) how an economist views
sustainable development.1
These two triangles show the interplay between the sustainable dimension of water
management and the economic dimension thereby providing a useful framework within
which to discuss these issues. Figure 1, "Objectives of environmentally sustainable
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development" represents many of the same concerns addressed through IWRM, while Figure
2, "How an economist sees it" represents the most common concerns of private investors. In
Figure 2 the goals are more streamlined and broad and while the economic objectives are
clear and precise the wording used for the social and ecological objectives is quite vague. For
example, in Figure 2 the terms for social objectives of "poverty reduction" and "equity",
these words are very ambiguous and there are no concrete methods are suggested for
achieving these goals. The opposite can be said for Figure 1, under Social Objectives, where
are very specific strategies are listed for achieving these goals such as "participation" and
"empowerment". In addition, under Ecological Objectives "carrying capacity" and
"ecosystem integrity" are objectives that can be measured and which are specific. This is in
sharp contrast to Figure 2 where Natural Resource Management is the only broad objective
mentioned.
These two views of sustainable development are analogous to the development of water
management systems, in which economic models previously focused exclusively on the
economic aspects of water and treating water as an economic good. This was also one of the
main criticisms of early PSP initiatives, that private water providers were more concerned
with getting a return on their investment than with being vigilant about taking care of the
needs of the poor.2 In addition, the triangle in Figure 2 illustrates how the key issues of
equity, poverty reduction and natural resource management are all defined and viewed
through an economist's lens. This is often the case in water management where these issues
are addressed through policies focused on a redistribution of growth (ie: through cross-
subsidies or other targeted subsidies) as opposed to direct aid programs. Figure 1 mentions
several objectives that have been identified in development policies, including IWRM as
goals set of goals necessary for the achievement of sustainable development. A synthesis of
the differing guiding principles illustrated by these two figures in the area of water
management will be necessary to reconcile the value debate about whether to treat water as a
social or economic good.
4.2 Water as an Economic Good
Managing water as an economic good can be loosely defined as an approach in which water
is allocated across competing uses in a way that maximizes its value to society.3 McNeill has
expanded on the concept of managing water as an economic good by adding that water needs
to be handled as an economic good because it is a scarce resource and that competition over
the allocation of this resource leads to a serious situation in which there is simply not enough
water available for unlimited use by all potential users.4 Historically, water has been provided
by the government as a public good, which often included heavy subsidies to both residential
and commercial users. This method of water management led to the wasteful use of water
resulting in exploitation of many rivers and aquifers. Pricing water in a way that reflects its
economic worth, as determined by environmental economists, is one step towards the
sustainable management of many freshwater resources.5 It is generally assumed that raising
water costs negatively impacts the equitable distribution of water. Although it is generally
thought that higher prices translate into prices that are too expensive for poor people, the
opposite may actually be true since poor families spend a higher percentage of their income
on water when they are compelled to purchase water from independent water vendors.6
Peter Rogers, Radhike de Silva and Ramesh Bhatia are among the scholars who believe
increasing prices can improve equity in water management. They maintain that "higher water
rates allow utilities to extend services to those currently not served and those currently forced
to purchase water from vendors at very high prices".7 Prices which account for the full
economic worth of water may aid in maintaining the sustainability of the resource. According
to this ideology, water is currently under priced which leads to wasteful and inefficient use.
When the cost is raised, people have the incentive to be more conservative in their water use.
There are many benefits to be reaped by providing water at a cost that more accurately
reflects its true value (not necessarily market value). These include:
1. A higher price will lessen demand. It shifts the water management paradigm from one of supply to
demand management; thereby promoting more efficient water use.
2. Higher prices increase supply which may allow for the development of marginal projects.
3. Increased prices reduce the per unit cost of water to poor people (in Increasing Block Tariffs - IBTs).
Increases in prices mean that there is more water "saved" which can now be allocated to poor users and
increased profits can be invested in creating/repairing water infrastructure in poor urban and rural
areas. It also lessens poor users' dependence on water vendors who often charge exorbitant prices for
water of questionable quality.
4. Releasing water for higher value use and assisting the prioritisation of water allocation. By increasing
the price of water will discourage lower value uses (water in toilets, some industrial uses where potable
water is not necessary) and increase the overall supply. It will also facilitate re-allocation between
sectors.
5. Increased prices improve managerial efficiency due to increased revenues which can be used to
improve infrastructure maintenance, staff training and making modern monitoring and management
techniques affordable.
3
 Gleick, P et. al., 2002 "Globalization and International Trade of Water" in Gleick, The World's Water: The
Biennial Report on the World's Freshwater Resources. 2002 p. 37.
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6. Leads to long-term sustainability of the resource because it reduces the overall demand on the resource
base and leads to demand management.8
Inefficiencies currently being experienced by water utilities in both developed and
developing countries are the primary reasons why raising prices could be beneficial. For the
purpose of clarification, treating water as an economic good and raising prices to change
users' water habits does not mean raising prices in a way that effects all users in the same
way. Furthermore when considering pricing structures and tariffs, pricing does not need to
occur at market-price levels. The underlying concept of treating water as an economic good is
that water is a scarce resource that is in high demand and it should not be wasted.9 Intrinsic to
principle 4, is the right to basic water services at an affordable price. There are many ways to
achieve this, either through a tariff system or by guaranteeing basic access to everyone (25
litres per person per day), as has been done in South Africa. The driving ideal behind treating
water as an economic good is that increasing the cost of water will lead to a more equitable
and efficient use of water resources by encouraging conservation and protection of water
resources and by discouraging wasteful practices. This can be achieved mainly by changing
the water supply paradigm from one of supply-side to demand-side management.
4.2.1 Analysis of general premise of water as an economic good
The view of Rogers, de Silva and Bhatia seems counter intuitive to the very real situation of
1.2 billion people lacking access to drinking water. Their argument states that raising prices
will ultimately benefit the poor. Their argument hangs on two premises, the first that water is
undervalued from an economic perspective and secondly that economic tools (price increases,
specific tariff structures) should be used to encourage the conservation of water resources -
increasing the amount "left over" to be allocated to poor areas. I agree with Rogers et al. that
water is undervalued, and that the provision of water services is a service that should be
priced in a way that reflects its full value. This policy is called full cost recovery. I disagree
with the extension of this concept to poor consumers, because their limited access, as well as
considerable time and effort needed to acquire water implies that they have a highly
developed concept of the social and economic values of water. On the one hand, a policy that
increases prices will immediately affect those already attached to the network and would help
subsidise extending the network into poorer communities. On the other hand, such a policy
could easily be inappropriately applied to poor communities and essentially price poor
consumers out of being able to pay for the minimum amount of water needed for survival,
thereby forcing them to use unsafe and less expensive water sources. This issue will be
discussed again in relation to the desk studies and working questions later in this study.
The second premise of Rogers et. al.'s argument is that there will be more water "saved" via
demand management that can then be allocated to poor residential users. This is a very
problematic concept because there is no guarantee that an increase in prices will actually
affect consumers on a large enough scale to divert water resources to poor neighbourhoods.
Moreover, this statement represents the prioritising of water resources to those who can pay
for them over those who cannot. Water resources should be allocated, specifically for
residential use in poor areas. These people stand to gain the most from extension of access.
The list of the benefits of pricing water at its economic value are either direct quotes or a combination of ideas
from: Calder, I., 1999. The Blue Revolution. London: Earthscan and Ibid 4
9
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The behaviour of wasteful water use is more commonly found amongst consumers with a
connection to the network, who can pay for services.
The main premise of their argument that water services should be self financing and cover
supply costs via tariff systems is an important component of sustainable water management
and understanding the full value of water. Although I do not agree with all of the points made
Rogers et. al., water is underpriced in some sectors and the history of supply-side
management has led to residential and industrial users alike underestimating the value of
water. Changes in price systems will be necessary to cover the costs of infrastructure
development and expansion. They are also needed to raise awareness of the multifaceted
values of water. Rogers et. al. do address an important issue that the rate of extraction has
exceeded recharge rates in several areas and that the sustainable use of local and global water
resources depends on better awareness of the value of water.
The following sections will describe two guiding principles of managing water as an
economic good, these include demand management and willingness to pay both of which
affect the affordability and perceived and real value of water resources. These issues are
important to clarify and discuss as they relate directly to determining the most effective way
to balance the social and economic aspects of water as reflected in the ability of poor people
to afford water services.
4.2.2 Demand Management
Demand-side water management can be defined as "the implementation of policies or
measures that serve to control or influence the consumption or waste of water".10 The shift to
demand management from supply-side management drastically alters the way that we have
come to view water as a resource. Traditionally, the goal of water service providers was to
maximize supply and use of the water resource. Any residual river flow that reached the
ocean was viewed as a waste. x Instead of keeping supply volumes up, demand management
emphasises conservation and prudent water use by all sectors. In most areas of the world
water is provided at a price well below supply cost, giving people no incentive to use water
efficiently. Increasing prices is a relatively simple way to change users' behaviour and more
importantly to change the way they think about their own and other sectors' water use. The
benefits to be gained from introducing new pricing and tariff schemes were outlined earlier in
this chapter. Initial resistance to treating water as an economic good may be in part a reaction
to the common notion that poor people are unable to pay for water at its current price. The
fact is that many poor water users pay well over market value for their water because there is
no municipal water source near their homes and they are forced to buy water at much higher
prices then would be expected. In fact in many instances poor households can pay as much as
25% of their household income on water.12
Demand management has the possibility of positively affecting poor people by imposing an
increasing price structure on industry and wealthier residential users. The benefits of demand
management will not be directly felt in poor communities until improvements and extensions
10
 United Nations, 2003. Water for People Water for Life. UNESCO & Berghahn Books p. 181
11
 Calder, I., 1999. The Blue Revolution. London: Earthscan. P. 55
12
 Mehta, Lyla. 2000. "Water for the twenty-first century: challenges and misconceptions" IDS Working Paper
No. 111.
42
in the current network are made, as a result of funding acquired via full cost recovery and
demand management strategies.
4.2.3 The Willingness to Pay Principle (WTP)
The Willingness to Pay (WTP) approach is used to determine approximately how much a
water user is willing to pay for water services. It is determined by finding the demand curve's
illustration of the relationship between the amount of water used by customers and the
charging price. This information is usually gathered through survey methods or by public
reaction to a change in rates13. Although it is well known that in many places poor families
pay more than their wealthier counterparts for water, the value and WTP varies by sector. For
instance, the value of water used for irrigation can be determined in terms of agricultural
productivity, holding all other factor constant. "By taking the gross value of the crop per
hectare and subtracting all production costs ... and an acceptable profit margin, the remainder
can be viewed as the maximum WTP for water."14 The same process can be applied to other
sectors such as industry and tourism. The problem with applying this formula to the
residential user is that the projected WTP data is informed by survey results and how
consumers respond to rate changes.
The WTP data fails to take into account the possibility that there may be a difference between
willingness to pay and the maximum an individual can reasonably pay. Merritt draws this
distinction in his paper analysing 11 past WTP projects in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean
conducted by Whittington, the primary researcher into WTP among residential users. Merritt
finds fault with the survey questions because they ask for the amount an individual is willing
to pay per unit as opposed to a fixed charge. "WTP(max)" is not a meaningful concept from a
social science perspective if it is applied to water demand analysis pf projects where payment
is based on unit prices."15 Furthermore, it was reported by the World Bank Water Demand
Research Team that one respondent, when asked by an enumerator what the maximum he
would be willing to pay, the Haitian respondent replied "What do you mean the maximum I
would be willing to pay? You mean when someone has a gun to my head?."16 This
respondent's response illustrates the difficulty of trying to determine WTP (max) for both
current and prospective water users regarding their actual ability to pay because of the
absolute need for water on daily basis. Poor families have proven that they are willing to use
a large percentage of their household income on potable water which indicates their WTP for
water services.1
The WTP principle can be used very effectively to gauge WTP(max) in the agricultural,
industry etc. sectors but the issue becomes much more complicated just as soon as the strict
application of the WTP "formula" is applied to poor residential users. The pure economic
good aspect of water reflects only the economic value and no other values which should be
considered when setting prices. The affordability of water, specifically the ability for poor
residential users to pay for water services, is closely related to the water authority's use of
13
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tariff systems to express sensitivity to the economic and social needs of poor residential
users.
4.2.4 Affordability
Affordability differs from willingness-to-pay in that it is more closely related to the user's
ability-to-pay. Affordability is closely linked to access to water services. If water is priced
above what an average family, with a low level of income can afford, they are priced out of
access to water services. "Affordability of a piped water supply service may not be
distributed equitably among income groups or neighbourhoods. For the same water
consumption level and total bill, a poorer household will inevitably pay a higher proportion
of its income than a richer one..." 8 Imposition of water tariffs is a useful tool method of
promoting conservation through demand management which has several environmental and
social benefits. Tariffs can also be used to ensure that poor communities receive a
predetermined amount of water per day or per month to meet their basic water requirement.
Two tariff systems that aim to reconcile inequities in water pricing and distribution include
the lifeline tariff service and the increasing block tariff (IBT). A "lifeline" tariff structure is
designed to guarantee a minimum level of access to all, or to predetermined targeted areas.
This tariff structure is used when the water authority or government wishes to recognise
water as a human right by providing a basic level of water access free or at rates below full
cost (such as the case in South Africa).19 The IBT structure is based on volumetric charges as
opposed to fixed-rate charges. IBTs charge for each unit of water used and the price increases
with each subsequent unit of water consumed. For example, the first unit of water will be less
expensive than the eighth unit of water, even though the units contain the same amount of
water. This type of tariff structure promotes demand management and discourages wasteful
practices that become common when water consumption is based on unlimited water for a
fixed-rate per month.20 One of the problems with IBTs is that in some cases the price per unit
is further sub-classified by family size, location etc. This means that a large poor family
could be falsely classified into a more expensive "block" and end up paying more than a
small, rich family. This illustrates that the design of IBTs is far from foolproof but the blocks
and can be adjusted so that they have the intended effect. In addition to installing various
tariff structures, the water authority may receive subsidies, which will reduce the price passed
on to the consumer. Subsidies artificially lower the cost passed on to the consumer by
allowing the water utility to price water at levels below full cost recovery.
4.2.5 Summery of water as an economic good
The previous sections have discussed, clarified and analysed various aspects of treating and
pricing water as an economic good. These issues relate back to Figure 2 of Serageldin's
triangles. The economic view of sustainability frames the social and ecological objectives of
sustainability in terms of economics. This is essentially the view presented by Rogers et. al.
as well as by economists who believe that a tariff structure can be build upon hypothetical
projections of willingness to pay. Under the Rogers paradigm, equity and poverty alleviation
is achieved partially through altering the principles by which water is allocated and managed.
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Demand management is an effective way to address the ecological objective of natural
resource management by economically forcing consumers to limit their use of the resource
due to an increasing price structure. Demand management has the potential to be a powerful
tool in limiting water use for consumers of large quantities of water and wealthier residential
consumers. Demand management policies seem out of place, however, if they are applied to
poor communities where the central issue is extending access in an affordable way, rather
than limiting it due to an unreasonable tariff structure. The following sections will present the
social aspects of water in more detail.
4.3 Water as a Social Good
Access to water is necessary for human survival, yet it is estimated that over a billion people
lack access to safe drinking water and two and a half billion lack access to sanitation. ' This
has a serious debilitating effect on the ability of a community to develop in a variety of ways.
There is no universally accepted definition of a social good, so the term can be construed in a
number of different ways. This section will discuss, clarify and analyse the social good
aspects of water provision as well as discuss the social value of providing water access to
poor areas. These definitions will also be discussed in relation to Seageldin's triangle on
environmentally sustainable development at the end of this chapter as they pertain to the
creation of appropriate institutional frameworks through which to distribute and regulate
water services.
Social goods are defined from an economic perspective as goods that have a "spillover"
effect, which is to say that they create benefits and value in a way which is not reflected in
the economic price. Another definition of a social good is something that is needed to fulfil a
basic human need or something that is necessary for human development.22 Access to water
is a basic human need and access to water services is closely tied to development and a lower
incidence of water-related diseases. Social goods are also characterised by improving the
social well being of the individual consumer as well as that of the wider society due to its
availability.
Water as a "spillover" or positive economic externality, is illustrated by a general
improvement in school attendance, especially among girls. This is because women and girls
are generally the group saddled with the responsibility of gathering water. This process can
be very time consuming, and as it is a necessary duty, girls' education is considered a much
lower priority. Woman and girls are the first group to suffer the effects of poor sanitation
facilities. In cases where the privacy and security of facilities is questionable or culturally
inappropriate, females who go into such areas risk being attacked. This is one of the primary
reasons why parents keep their daughters out of school in many countries24
More direct externalities from improved access that foster improvement in the social well
being of individuals and the larger society, are associated with a reduced child morbidity rate
for diseases such as diarrhoea, which currently cause 2.2 million deaths per year. Deaths due
21
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to diarrhoea represent 15% of all child deaths under the age of 5 in developing countries.25
Access to water is very closely linked to poverty alleviation and to associated improvements
in the health of a population.
Water fulfils basic biological and cultural human needs. Water is important for economic
development and religious ceremonies. It has cultural significance and is absolutely essential
for life and health. Therefore water management needs to take into account the needs and
competing values of stakeholders. Putting a price tag on these values is very difficult yet they
represent the main reason why improved water allocation / access to the poor is a Millennium
Development Goal (MDGs)
Access to water services is a prerequisite to sustainable development. This sets water apart
from other goods and services, including basic utilities, such as electricity. It is exactly this
issue that makes managing and allocating water resources sensitive to a purely economic
strategy. Ensuring that the public receives an adequate supply of social goods, including
education, water, housing, public transportation is generally the domain of the government
because providing these goods, as social and not economic goods, is not profitable. Providing
water services has become profitable due to its treatment as an economic good. Because
water is so closely related to health, there are both short-term and long-term effects of
insufficient water access and the provision of unsafe water to consumers. In the short-term
people can develop diseases such as cholera which can immediately be traced back to the
water provider, thereby giving them an incentive to provide safe water. The long-term
consequences of providing unsafe water to an area are not risky enough to deter to private or
independent water providers from such practices because profits are not usually affected-
people will continue to buy water from the same unsafe source because it is more difficult to
trace and because treating the water would reduce the profit margin. This is one of the main
reasons why the public sector has been the primary provider of water, because the social good
aspects are primary and the economic aspects are secondary. The situation is reversed in
privatisation, where meeting the economic bottom line is the first priority and social goods
are secondary because they have no immediate impact on the ability to pay for the good. The
recognition of water as a social good continues to be an issue that has been hotly contended
within the privatisation debate. The social nature of water has led many governments to
provide water for free or at highly subsidised prices in the past. In theory, this should make
water available to everyone, including the poorest people.2 The problem with this approach
is that it has consistently undervalued water and water delivery. Also, the inability to create a
financially self sufficient water management system has resulted in poorly maintained
infrastructure, the accumulation of massive debt and the consistent inability or unwillingness
of the utility to extend access to poor areas. In 2002, the debate became more heated when
access to water was declared to be a human right.
4.3.1 The Human Right to Water
In November of 2002, The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights released
General Comment 15, which effectively proclaimed water to be a human right as well as a
prerequisite for the realization of other human rights. The General Comment pinpointed four
areas which are contained in the right to water: "water must be adequate for human dignity
25
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and health...Available. The water supply for each person must be sufficient and continuous
for personal and domestic uses ..Quality. The water required for each personal or domestic
use must be safe .. .Accessibility. Water and water facilities and services have to be accessible
to everyone without discrimination, within the jurisdiction or the State party...."27 The
concept of accessibility is further subdivided into 4 categories: physical accessibility,
economic accessibility, non-discrimination and information accessibility. Physical
accessibility refers to the actual distance to the water source. Economic accessibility refers to
the pricing mechanism in place and states that water must be affordable to all. Non-
discrimination refers to the need for water facilities to be available to all individuals
regardless of race, ethnicity etc. Finally, information accessibility includes the right to
participate and receive information about water management practices.
Support for the official declaration of human right to water evolved out of the argument that
water and sanitation are more than basic needs, but actually constitute fundamental human
rights. The legal basis for the right to water can be found in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention on
the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). The original framers of the UDHR did not deem it necessary at
the time of drafting the UDHR because access to water was thought to be as elemental as
access to air. The right to have access to water is thought to be a precondition for many of the
other human rights defined by the UDHR and subsequent covenants and conventions.
Making water a human right has great significance. Human rights are protected by
international law and they ensure universally recognized freedoms. Human rights represent
an obligation between the individual and the State as well as the responsibility of the State to
respect, protect, fulfil and promote the right to water. Addressing the issue of access to
drinking water and sanitation from a rights-based approach changes the nature of the
relationship between the State and the individual as well as the obligations of the State.
Individuals now have a legal right to water as outlined in General Comment 15. "Rather than
seeing people as passive recipients of aid, the rights-based approach puts the individual at the
centre of development."
Prior to General Comment 15 and the declaration of a human right to water, the discussion
centred on defining a Basic Water Requirement (BWR)of litres per capita per day (lpcd)
which generally included drinking water and sanitation requirements. Various development
aid organisations including USAID, the World Bank and the World Health Organisation
recommend between 20-40 lpcd, which excludes water for cooking and bathing. Peter Gleick,
a renowned water policy researcher recommends 50 lpcd, which can be broken down into 5
lpcd for drinking, 20 lpcd for sanitation (BWR recommendations are usually restricted to
drinking water and sanitation), 15 lpcd for bathing and 10 litres for cooking, independent of
climate and cultural context. In South Africa the government has defined the BWR as 25
lpcd which covers drinking water and sanitation.
General Comment 15 has the potential to change the relationship between water service
suppliers and individuals, especially when third parties such as private companies are
27 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002). General Comment 15: the right
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involved in water supply. There remains the problem of enforcing this right. Article 25 of the
UDHR states that everyone has the right to food, yet millions die of starvation each year.
Expanding upon the concrete notions of BWR may be the best way to fulfil and promote this
right. BWRs represent hard numbers which can be monitored over time by the government as
well as by NGOs and researchers. I argue that the optimal water management systems should
integrate the economic and social good aspects of water. To do so requires knowledge of the
competing values concerning water, both hard, price values as well as social and
environmental externalities.
General Comment 15 specifically mentions the economic accessibility of water services as
well as the physical accessibility of water services. Within the four problem areas the issue of
affordability is closely linked to the economic accessibility, while physical accessibility
relates to the need to physically extend network coverage to poor, marginal areas, currently
outside of network range. The fact that General Comment 15 specifically mentions these two
aspects (among others) means that the State has a duty to fulfil and promote this right.
Companies also have a duty to comply with and promote this right under international human
rights law.
4.4 Determining the full value of water
At the 1998, expert group meeting for the United Nations Commission for Sustainable
Development 6 (UNCSD 6) held in Harare, Rogers' paper was used to evaluate the different
values involved in determining the full value of water which accounts for the economic,
environmental and social value.30 He refers to the three most important concepts in water
economics which are: price, cost and value. The price is the amount set by the political or
social system which ensures cost recovery, equity and sustainability which may or may not
include subsidies. The cost includes operations and maintenance, capital, opportunity as well
as economic and environmental externalities. The value differs from the cost because it
involves the benefits to users, from return flows as well as indirect and intrinsic benefits.
Using these concepts it is interesting to examine the difference in his two graphs depicting
the general principles for the cost of water and the principles for value in use. Rogers defines
the full supply cost of water as including both the operation and maintenance costs of water
works as well as capital charges which include capital consumption and interest costs
associated with water works supply and distribution systems. Determining the full value of
water includes the economic value which takes into consideration full supply cost, the
opportunity costs and economic externalities. Economic and environmental externalities are
closely linked. They include the upstream diversion of resources for irrigation or the pollution
of downstream users due to pesticide run-off. In addition, environmental externalities are
generally closely related to public health and ecosystem maintenance. Pollution that
compromises the ecosystem in a way that effects human health it is considered an
environmental externality. That same pollution may also result in increased costs associated
with production because the water needs to be purified- an economic externality.
30
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Figure 4 depicts the actual costs associated with drinking water and sanitation water supply.
The problem in many cases is that very often the price of the water services to not equal the
costs of providing the services. Figure 5 draws attention to the value of water- the benefits
experienced by users and the environment.
The values represented in Figure 5 include: 1) the willingness to pay, (value to users) 2)
benefits to the environment and the user by water that is used for one purpose but which then
goes back into the hydrological cycle 3) externalities such as improved school attendance by
girls or better health; social good aspects of water allocation 4) social objectives such as
poverty alleviation and increased employment in rural areas are social objectives that
typically involve water allocation arrangements. Finally, the intrinsic value of the water
which is the difference between the full value and the economic value is the hardest to
"measure". The intrinsic value is the desirability of the water in a specific place. For example,
the increase in the cost of a house that has a "waterfront view" or that is 10 minutes drive
from the lake or ocean. The benefit is the value of the water in situ, without adding in
environmental externalities.
Rogers' work goes a long way to tease out and define the different costs and values
associated with water supply. What remains clear is that water is generally under-priced and
under-valued, from an economic perspective. This is why many economists and water policy
experts have begun to argue for pricing policies that guarantee full cost recovery. There is a
need for an approach to water management that takes both the economic and social goods
aspects into account and also gives water users an opportunity to participate in the water
allocation and pricing process.
4.4.1 Full Cost Recovery
Water provides a variety of economic services, such as industrial production, irrigation in
agriculture, hydropower as well as a variety of social services via drinking water and
sanitation. The range of these services means that there will always be competition for water
resources and services. As discussed in the previous section, water pricing has not always
been an accurate reflection of the values and costs associated both with the provision of water
services and with the environmental and social externalities associated with water access.
Full cost recovery passes the true cost of water services on to the user and ensures the long-
term sustainability of the water authority as well as wastewater treatment and infrastructure
development and repair. The concept of full cost recovery was first stated in the Ministerial
Declaration of The Hague in 2000 and later adopted by a special session of the UN in 1997:
"economic valuation of water should be seen within the context of its social and economic
implications, reflecting the importance of meeting basic needs. Consideration should be given
to the gradual implementation of pricing policies that are geared towards cost recovery". 2
This quote reflects the UN's acknowledgement that policies implementing full cost recovery
can be misused to price poor people out of water services under the guise of socially sensitive
and progressive tariff structures that are meant to balance the social and economic aspects of
water.
Despite the persuasive arguments for full-cost recovery pricing policies, tariff structures that
price by the volume and other economic factors, have been difficult to implement. According
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to the UN's World Water Development Report, this is due to low social acceptance of paying
for water because water users are accustomed to having their water provided at a minimal
charge, from primarily public water providers. In addition, it may be difficult to determine
how much water is used per household (for example if the family collects water at a
communal standpipe) therefore, a fixed rate is applied to all the houses in the area using that
water source, irrespective of how much water they actually consume. A report from the panel
on financing water infrastructure from the Third World Water Forum, suggests tweaking the
universal full cost recovery model in favour of sustainable cost recovery.
Sustainable cost recovery is more sensitive to the needs of different socio-economic groups.
James Winpenny, the author of this report suggests customizing a full cost recovery plan so
that all users neither pay the same price for access to water services nor become
inappropriately lumped together into the same IBT group. One way to target poor families for
special tariffs or reduced rates would be to create pro-poor policies that are transparent and
individually target families that deserve a reduced rates or a lifeline tariff.34 Cost recovery
plans should also be flexible enough to adapt to the differing needs of urban, peri-urban and
rural poor areas as their need for water may be different based on access to alternative water
resources, climate and culture. There may also be a difference in the infrastructure costs of
providing these different types of areas with water services. Finally, Winpenny recommends
that if subsidies are needed or comprise a significant portion of water revenue, that they
should be affordable (be feasible within the general budget), targeted (pro-poor) and
transparent (visible to the public and identifiable in public accounts).3 In some cases higher
water prices paid by industry or agriculture could provide the funds to subsidise a lifeline
tariff to poor families. In other cases where subsidies are intended to act as a transition to
higher water rates they should be tapered after an appropriate period of time. The pricing and
tariff structure of water determines the affordability of water services for poor people.
Traditionally the water authority has determined the nature and amount of water tariffs
without receiving input from the affected communities. Within the system of IWRM there is
space for a more community oriented approach to water management that involves a high
degree of stakeholder involvement and a dynamic approach to institutional arrangements.
Finding a balance between the social and economic aspects of water and creating a set of
rules by which to access and allocate the water resources is the last piece of the puzzle. Water
has been traditionally provided and regulated by the public sector in a way that commonly
fails to reflect either the economic cost of providing the service or even just the supply cost.
The change from a public to private utility often highlights a change in the form of regulation
and in the way water as a good is treated. Publicly owned utilities can implement policies that
prioritise the economic aspect of water over the social as easily as privately owned utilities.
The difference is that this rarely occurs because political decisions to raise the price of water
for agriculture, industry and the wealthier residents are not usually well received by the
electorate. Private utilities on the other hand are answerable to a regulator and consumers but
are not subject to the same type of political pressure and therefore may have more
manoeuvrability in altering the existing pricing structure. The presence of a private utility
creates a more definite dividing line between the service provider and the regulator.
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4.5 Summary
This chapter reviewed the economic and social values of water by using the framework of
Serageldin's sustainability triangles. The issue of reconciling these two values of water in a
tangible way has been a major problem for both public and private water utilities. The next
chapter will focus on the case studies that provide contextual information on the
implementation of both PSP and IWRM. The Bolivia desk study will expand upon the
implementation of a concession agreement in Cochabamba and the South African desk study
will focus on a national effort to reorganise water management and implement IWRM.
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Chapter 5
Desk Studies
The following chapter will depict two desk studies, which represent a progression in
water management techniques. As previously stated, many anti-privatisation activists
are weary of PSP - to any degree, largely due to the Cochabamba case. Cochabamba
represents an early form of privatisation, and lacks aspects of IWRM that would have
made the project more viable. The second case will focus on the effort by the South
African government to implement IWRM, more specifically the capacity building
efforts needed to solicit community participation and the policy of Free Basic Water
for everyone in South Africa. Each desk study will include background information
followed by first a general analysis which will then be followed by a more specific
analysis focused on the areas of 1) extending service to marginalized areas, 2)
affordability and 3) transparency and community participation and 4) the role of the
regulator.
5.1 The Cochabamba, Bolivia Case: PSP
5.1.1 The water situation in Cochabamba prior to PSP
Cochabamba is Bolivia's third largest city with a current population of 834.9 thousand
inhabitants.1 The population has risen by approximately 56,3 thousand since 2001,
two years after the attempted privatization of the water utility. Cochabamba is located
in a fertile valley and agriculture is the largest consumer of water. Approximately
70% of agricultural land is either temporarily or permanently irrigated. Access to
water services is one of the lowest in all South American countries. Only 75% of the
total urban population (throughout all of Bolivia) had access to services via household
water connections and only 36% had sewage connections.3 The water situation in
Cochabamba is very poor due to both natural scarcity and mismanagement of the
water utility over a long period of time. The water quality is poor, despite a national
law passed in 1985 that outlined standards for drinking water, Cochabamba had still
not complied with minimum standards as late as 1996.4 The water supply in
Cochabamba had been provided by the same municipal company, SEMAPA, since
1967.
1
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By 1997, the utility was plagued with inefficiency and suffered from both managerial
problems and leaks in the pipes. Approximately 57% of the population was served by
this water service and SEMAPA had 50% losses in unaccounted water due to
leakages.6 SEMAPA also had problems of water availability; it had failed to meet the
demand of about 39% of its customers. Due to persistent water shortages and scarcity
there was a constant situation of rationing. "In many areas of the city, water was only
available for a few hours once or twice a week."7 This situation was even worse
during the dry season. In 1997, natural water resources were so low that many
consumers, with full connections to the network, had used up their well resources and
had constructed their own water tanks for private use. Among the 43% of the
population not served by the piped network controlled by SEMAPA, 25% depended
on water from private wells and 12% from water vendors.8 Although these people
were not served by the water network, they often paid more for their water, which
they usually purchased from independent water vendors or from other consumers with
house connections. Those with access to the piped network were able to take
advantage of any subsidies or tariff structure provided by SEMAPA while those
without house connections paid to the water vendors directly.
SEMAPA's inefficiency and failure to provide basic access to a large segment of the
population combined with its financial deficit led the government to consider other
management options, including privatisation.
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5.2 The Concession Agreement
Cochabamaba was in need of a new plan to help remedy the insufficient level of water
resources and due to over-pumping, and low recharge rate of the aquifer located
below the city, exploring ground water resources was not an option. Two plans were
presented for the privatisation agreement: the Corani and the Misicuni. Below is a
comparison of the two projects.
At first glance, the Corani project is superior to the Misicuni project, the costs are
lower, the infrastructure for the water project is already in place (the reservoir) and
tariff structure and project feasibility was not dependent on the purchase of water for
irrigation. Water would be delivered to Cochabamaba via an 1 lkm tunnel based on a
"take or pay" contract whereby the buyer agrees to buy a specific volume of water at
an agreed price. Under this form of agreement, the price must be paid even if the
agreed volume of water is not delivered.9
The Misicuni project had the political backing that the Corani project lacked. The
proposal to dam the Misicuni river for both hydropower and drinking water had been
around since the 1950s. The construction of the Misicuni Multipurpose Project
(MMP) would result in a 120m dam, a reservoir to regulate the 6.6 cu. m/sec flow of
9Ibid3p.l06
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raw water, a 19.4km. tunnel and a hydroelectric power plant. The result of this
enormous undertaking would be "drinking water for five municipalities in the
Cochabamba valley, water for the irrigation of 10.000 ha. and 120MW in new
electricity generating capacity".10 Given information regarding the numerous and
cross-sector benefits of the MMP it was the preferred project to solve the water
shortage problem. Prior to implementing the project the World Bank conducted a
feasibility report that indicated that the project was not feasible due to its high costs -
ca. $300 million. After some debate in the courts, a 40 year BOT concession contract
was awarded to Aguas del Tunari Consortium (AdT), the sole bidder, despite a
Bolivian law stating that there should be a minimum of three bids for a privatisation
project.11
5.3 Implementation
The terms of the concession contract were very clear regarding tariff structure, which
included an IBT beginning with a 35% initial increase as well as mandatory expansion
targets for water service which included 57,600 new water connections and 58,200
new sewerage connections by 2004. In terms of network coverage, AdT estimated that
by 2004 90% would have water supply coverage and 88% sewerage connections and
by 2034 100% of the population would have access and be connected to both
services.12 Achieving these goals required the implementation of a socially
progressive tariff structure as well as the cooperation of the local community and the
municipal government.
5.3.1 Tariff Structure
At the outset, changes were made to the MMP project to reduce the costs from $300
to $214 million by limiting service to the city of Cochabamba. Under the concession,
which came into force on November 1, 1999, AdT had planned to introduce a
progressive increasing block-tariff. Consumers were classified into nine groups based
on type of housing (empty lots, houses, precarious dwellings through functional
apartments and luxury housing). The tariff structure also incorporated differential
rates within the fixed charge which meant that wealthy residents would pay 2-3 times
as much (per cu. m.) as poor residents. IBTs are part of demand management and try
to force decreased consumption and conservation because the water provider imposes
a rising cost per unit consumed. The old SEMAPA tariff system worked the other way
around; the more the consumer used, the less they paid per unit - even during periods
of extreme water scarcity.
AdT knew that the progressive tariff system might be difficult to implement, therefore
they tried to persuade the municipality to delay the construction of the dam and focus
on leakage control, which would allow them to delay the implementation of the new
tariff structure. Had AdT focused on leakage control and improving the structure of
the current system, they could have greatly improved water service, albeit to those
10Ibidp.l05
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with access to the system. The leakage factor at the time of the hand over was
approximately 60%. AdT argued that focusing on leakage first and delaying the
expensive dam project could have allowed them to ease into a lower progressive tariff
structure.13
"A close examination of these tariffs persuaded us that such a rapid increase would
be difficult socially, with out modifying the tariff structure ... by deferring the
construction of the dam, the initial upfront expenditure would have been diminished
thus allowing for a much lower and progressive increase in tariffs ...unfortunately we
could not convince the government's Negotiating Committee that this approach was
the most reasonable to pursue ... we proposed that the municipality implement a tariff
structure that would put no or few increases on the poorest citizens and increase
substantially the bill for the large users, which happen to be wealthy. This structure
was reluctantly accepted, "14
The tariff structure that was implemented included an increase by 35% and was
introduced in January 2000 (the rate increases covered both December and January).
The rate increases covered the initial costs of the Misicuni dam, plus the accumulated
debt from SEMAPA, the use of the tunnel to transfer the water and existing SEMAPA
assets. Under the AdT concession, leakage rates were decreased, improved billing
administration combined with the re-categorization of consumers in to the different
"blocks" from the IBT tariff, made more water available to users which in turn led to
greater consumption. "To some extent, water bills increased not only because of an
increase in price but also because of an increase in volume consumed."15 Due to
increased water availability and improved service, combined with the new tariff
structure, some families were faced with water bill increases on the order of 200%!16
5.3.2 Exclusivity
The concession contract granted AdT exclusive rights to both water services and
water resources. Exclusivity over the provision of services is generally guaranteed
under concession contracts because it reduces the revenue risk and makes a particular
project more attractive to bidders. It prevents users who may be subject to a high IBT,
to support cross-subsidies, from switching to another, less expensive, service
provider. Exclusivity is a disadvantage to users who find themselves categorized in
the high end, but it provides great benefits to water users in lower income groups.17
In the Cochabamba concession, exclusivity was granted over both water service and
water resources which caused problems with the alternative water solutions the
residents had developed and relied upon for years. Cochabamba was unique in that the
rich had wells and storage tanks and there were a number of tanker-based vendors for
the poor. Under privatisation, the rich customers faced water bills that far exceeded
13
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their bills under SEMAPA, they were also no longer allowed to use the water from
their wells - the resource belonged to AdT. In the long-term, the poor users would
have gained increased access to the water network had AdT continued as the water
provider. In the short-term, the water vendors that poor communities depended upon
were put temporarily out of business, which greatly limited the water access to these
communities.
5.4 Public Reaction
Very shortly after the handover of control of the water services from SEMAPA to
AdT, civil unrest broke out. People were outraged at the sharp increase in prices. In
addition, due to AdT's exclusivity over the water resources, farmers now had to pay
for their irrigation (which previously was free), water vendors lost their business and
the wealthy could no longer use their private tanks and wells. In Cochabamba there
was also the situation of the coca-leaf farmers who had moved from the countryside to
the city in search of work. The coca-leaf farmers had been flushed-out due to a US -
led anti-narcotics campaign. The migration of coca farmers to the city had a major
impact on unemployment and the growth of the informal sector.19 There were several
major outbursts of public protest that culminated in a major riot in which six people
died, 38 were injured and which was declared an official state of emergency. The
final cancellation of the contract occurred on April 10, 2000; meaning that AdT was
officially in control of water services for approximately 5 months.21
5.5 Analysis of the Cochabamba Concession
While some water activists (Jim Shultz and Maude Barlow) hold up the Cochabamba
concession as an example of a community in a developing country standing up to the
evil forces of globalisation, the situation in Cochabamba was more complex.22 The
situation and circumstances surrounding the AdT concession agreement did result in
the failure of a water project that might have greatly benefited the poorest citizens of
Cochabamba. AdT inherited a water system in which less than 60% of the population
were receiving water services. The leakage factor was 60% in November when AdT
took control of SEMAPA. By January, attention to leakage control had increased
water flows by 30%.23 What is clear from the Cochabamba concession is that the tariff
policies, although progressive, were not implemented slowly and did not reflect the
18Ibid3p.ll2
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water users' ability to pay for water. The issue of exclusivity over the water resources
did not earn AdT any good will from farmers, wealthy users with their own wells and
tanks and water vendors. The Misicuni project, which was deemed unfeasible by the
World Bank, was the one the municipality ultimately chose due to a political agenda,
not necessarily because it was the best option available. Lastly, the decision to give
the concession contract to the sole bidder, AdT, was a direct violation of Bolivian law.
The following sections will go more into depth regarding the affordability, extending
access to marginal communities and lastly community participation and transparency
issues associated with the Cochabamba concession.
5.5.1 Affordability: Was AdT successful in making water
resources affordable to the poorest citizens?
There is little question that the implementation of the new tariff system intensified
suspicions that the concession contract would result in raised prices. Shortly after the
handover from the publicly owned SEMAPA to AdT protests began. Although the
IBT tariff structure aimed to reduce water prices for the poor and increase them for
the rich, only 75% of the total population had access to the network and activities
during the first (and only) months of the concession only benefited those already
hooked up to the network. Moreover, price increases did not necessarily follow visible
improvements in service. Consumers were well aware of the fact that ownership of
their water company had just changed hands and whatever apprehension they felt
regarding the privatisation of their water utility was made worse by the immediate
receipt of higher water bills and a new system of tariffs - a system with operating
principles completely opposed to the one they were accustomed to. Postponing the
dam would have meant a much less drastic increase in prices and might have been
more socially acceptable. Finally, although the increased targets were focused on
wealthy consumers, it is important to keep in mind that 70% of the population of
Bolivia lives below the poverty line, therefore many families considered "wealthy" by
the water authority faced increases in their water bill by 150% and may have faced
real difficulty paying. Although the steep rate increases were most dramatic for the
"wealthier" residential users as well as for farmers, rates were increased across the
board for everyone who had access to the network. Due to the nature of the IBT and
the short period of the concession, AdT was not successful in making water access
affordable to poor users. It is useful to qualify this statement by pointing out that
many of the poorest residents were not connected to the network were negatively
impacted by the exclusivity which effectively banned them from legally accessing
water resources through other means. Although the literature reviewed did not address
this specifically, one can reasonably assume that water vendors did not completely
halt service to poor areas but instead raised prices to compensate for the increased risk
involved in selling water to poor and wealthy users alike. This could only have made
a difficult situation more economically problematic for poor users by pricing them out
of the water market.
One of the major challenges of PSP is to reconcile users ability and willingness to pay
with private sector interests. Under the terms of the concession agreement, AdT was
allowed to retain a profit and was permitted to implement a tariff structure that would
24
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ensure that they gained a profit every month. This guaranteed a monthly profit and
reduced AdT's incentive to implement more efficient water saving technology or cost
efficiencies that would benefit the users.25 AdT could have used a price-cap approach
whereby prices are set for a number of years, if the concessionaire succeeds reducing
the cost of water provision below the level anticipated when the tariffs were set.
Under such conditions, the concessionaire can retain the savings as profit until the
next tariff review.26 This system would justify high returns to the water provider.
5.5.2 Extending Access: Were both social and economic
considerations accounted for in order to extend access
to marginal areas?
The Cochabamba case represents a situation where the economic value of water was
prioritised over the social value. Essentially, the choice to go with the MMP as
opposed to the Corani project necessitated extreme price increases to pay for the
construction project and paying down the debt left from SEMAPA. Funds were not
available to begin the construction necessary to extend the network into marginal
areas. Although there were goals for extending access to both drinking water and
sanitation services to poor areas, immediate improvements to the water service
benefited those already connected to the network. In addition, exclusivity over water
resources made selling water from tank-trucks by vendors illegal thereby cutting off
one of the stable means of water provision to poor consumers. Truck vendors are an
important part of water provision to marginalized communities, they have both the
equipment and ability to deliver water to areas that may not be connected to the main
network until several years into the concession. The period of the actual concession
was cut short but one can conjecture that the health situation would have become
worse due to reduced access to water.
5.5.3 Transparency and Community Participation: In what way
could community participation have been used to
increase transparency and possibly influence the utility
and the regulator?
Community participation was not a priority for either AdT or the state regulator.
Transparency remains an issue in this case as the concession contract for AdT has not
yet been made public in its entirety. Large town meetings should have been held to
answer any questions and to quell any anxiety, before the private company assumes
control of the utility. Furthermore, AdT could have used feedback from these
meetings to review their policies, in order to determine whether or not the current
project plan and projected cost increases were feasible given the current economic and
political environment. In Cochabamba portions of the contract were published and,
according to Global Water report, AdT "recommended that the municipality engage in
an information campaign in order to inform the population of the changes that were to
25
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be implemented."27 Greater transparency to some extent might have alleviated the
environment of distrust between AdT, the consumers and the municipality.
5.5.4 Role of the Regulator: What was the appropriate role of
the regulator in this case? How did politics colour the
outcome of this case?
The role of the regulator is defined by a 1994 law that created an institutional
environment that encouraged PSP in many sectors traditionally controlled by the
public sector, the national system is called Sistema de Regulation Sectoral
(SIRESE)28 The primary objective of SIRESE is to ensure that the activities of the
concessionaire are carried out in an efficient manner, that national and regional law is
upheld and that the interests of the consumers and the State are protected.29 The
regulator should perform all of the duties mentioned as SIRESE's main objectives; in
a manner that is independent from undue political pressure and that accounts for the
best interests of the consumers and the State - if possible. It is clear that from the
beginning the MMP was the only solution the regulator would consider because it had
been on the political agenda for such a long time. Indeed, it was decided to proceed
with this project, even after the World Bank had stated that it was not feasible. The
MMP was used as a political tool to win votes in the election that took place in 1997,
where the victorious candidate, Hugo Banzer promised to solve the water problem in
Cochabamba by implementing the MMP.30 The IBT and policy of cost-recovery was
implemented in a way that adversely affected residents due to the political decision to
go ahead with the MMP. Moreover, there were several attempts to re-negotiate the
tariff structure during the period of civil unrest, which were undertaken by the central
government and not by the regulator31, another example of the direct political
interference with the autonomy of both the utility and the regulator. The interference
by the government makes it difficult to assess the competency of the regulator as an
autonomous participant in this process. Bypassing the regulator under these
circumstances can certainly be attributed the highly politicised nature of the water
conflict in Cochabamba.
5.6 South Africa Desk Study: IWRM
The South African desk study will begin with general information about the national
water situation, the recent legislation that has set specific water targets as well as the
formed the basis for the implementation of IWRM on a national scale. As previously
mentioned, the desk study is divided up into two parts to address the four focus areas
of extending access, affordability, community participation and transparency and the
role of the regulator. The issues of community participation and regulatory water
institutions will be dealt with in the first part describing the implementation of the
27
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national IWRM project. The second part addresses the issues of extending access and
affordability via the national policy of providing free basic access. The
implementation of IWRM together with hard targets for extending access to areas
currently lacking drinking water and sanitation services is a very different approach
than the one taken in Bolivia. The point of this desk study is not to examine the
implementation of a PSP agreement, but instead to look at the national IWRM
implementation plan and to assess the success of this initiative. The thinking behind
the implementation of the national water resources strategy includes what is currently
believed to represent the best water resource management practices. This desk study
will show that although the South African water policy attempts to implement a water
policy that is very progressive and includes the elements of guaranteed free basic
access, extension of service, transparency and community participation, there are still
areas where it is failing achieve its objectives. In many of the WMAs there are both
private and public water service providers, as the full implementation of the IWRM
project has yet to be realised, it is difficult to foresee the way this project will
eventually effect the operations of current providers.32
5.7 South Africa's Water Situation
South Africa is located in a semi-arid part of the world. The annual rainfall is about
450mm, compared to a global average of 860mm per year. The evaporation rate is
relatively high which means that the national water resources are both scarce and
limited.33 The population of South Africa is estimated to be 43,8 million of which
52% live in urban areas of which 18% have either a minimal supply of water or none
at all and 22% do not have access to sanitation services.34 In rural areas estimates
range from 8-12 million people do not have reasonable access (as defined by the
World Health Organisation, WHO) to an adequate water supply.
In response to this situation, as well as the history of inequitable access, the new
South African government has developed a comprehensive policy for water
management and has guaranteed all its citizens a basic level of water access. Basic
water access follows WHO guidelines and is defined as 25 litres per person per day
within 200 meters walking distance.35 The constitution of South Africa guarantees the
right of every person to have access to sufficient water and obliges the state to take
reasonable measures to ensure that this right is realized.36 The government has also
implemented IWRM projects on a national scale and divided the country into 19
separate water management areas, that in many cases incorporate more than one
province. The government also feels that they have an obligation to redress past
inequalities in access to the resource.37 During the period of Apartheid, advanced
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water services were provided to white areas while black townships were left with a
very low level of water service that has resulted in unequal growth even since the end
of Apartheid.38
5.8 The National Water Act and White Paper on Water
Services
South Africa's National Water Act was assented to on August 20, 1998. The act states
very clearly that that water: 1) is a scarce and unevenly distributed resource, 2) that
water belongs to all people and that there is a need to redress past allocation strategies
that prevented the equal distribution of water, 3) the government is the ultimate
authority over the allocation and use of all national water resources, 4) the goal of the
national water resource management strategy is to achieve the sustainable use of
water resources for the benefit of all users and 5) delegates the management of the
resources to the catchment or regional level so that everyone can participate. The
National Water Act also lays down the guiding principles for the establishment of
catchment management agencies (CMAs) which will be established within each of the
water management areas (WMAs), as pictured in Figure 7.
The Draft White Paper on Water Services elaborates on the sector goals of the Water
Act as well as clarifies the role of the private sector in achieving their goals for water
allocation and supply. The water policy is based on three primary principles:
38
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1. "The equitable use of the resource, which is critical given the previous
inequitable access to the resource.
2. The optimal use of the resource, which is critical given the need for economic
growth in the country, and
3. The sustainable use of the resource, which is critical to balance the increasing
demands for the use of the resource with its long-term use for future
generations.40"
The sector targets, which are outlined in the White Paper, include: an additional 7
million people will have access to a basic water supply by 2008, an additional 18
million people will have access to basic sanitation services by 2010 and all schools
and clinics will have basic water services by 2005.41 Meeting these goals requires the
implementation of the guiding principles, which reflect both the economic and social
goods of water and which promotes smaller institutional arrangements for local water
allocation and management through the establishment of CMAs.
5.9 Implementation of IWRM initiative42
Implementation of the IWRM project in this area involves three main objectives, 1)
increased water conservation and demand management, 2) development of
groundwater water resources and 3) the creation or further development of
institutional arrangements for catchment management on the local level. Carl Bro
received a grant from DANCED to act as the chief consultant to DWAF in three
WMAs: WMA 3 Crocodile West - Marico, WMA 11 Umvoti to Umzimkulu and
WMA 17 Olifants - Doom. The objectives of the IWRM project were to be
implemented through a series of outputs that are based upon active community
participation from key stakeholders to establish functioning CMAs that will ultimately
control the allocation of water resources in that area. It is also envisioned that CMAs
will begin to have influence over tariff structures and act as the primary regulator and
point of contact for both consumer concerns and the central government.43 At the
outset of the project several assumptions were made: 1) that key stakeholders would
participate constructively in IWRM activities, 2) all water users would participate in
demand management and water conservation activities, including meetings and 3)
local authorities would provide the human and financial resources to implement and
approve conservation and demand management initiatives. Although agreements have
been made with several local water providers, there was a great deal of difficulty
convincing them to implement these policies. This raises questions as to the long-term
sustainability of the project. The implementation of the project is measured through
various outputs that include a number of educational workshops for community
40
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members to solicit their participation in the CMAs and capacity building measures to
ensure the long-term sustainability of the CMAs. In addition, a business plan will be
created for each CMA that includes aspects of conservation and demand management
as well as ongoing monitoring and advisory services.
5.9.1 Specifics about Implementation and working
assumptions
During the inception phase nine outputs were identified by the Carl Bro staff as
necessary for the sustainable implementation of IWRM in the three CMAs, three of
which are useful for this study, institutional arrangements for IWRM, stakeholder
participation and capacity building.44 Under each output, several assumptions as well
as priority areas were identified during the inception phase. The best way to
understand the project progression is to study the project reports and other
supplemental material to gauge project development, problems with the initial
assumptions, and changes in the direction of the project. Each of the three relevant
outputs will first be described in relation to the initial concepts during the inception
phase and then tracked through the subsequent progress reports.
The inception report identifies the scope of the project, key stakeholders, objectives
and targeted activities to achieve each of the outputs.
The second progress report, from March 200245, reveals that the project team has
underestimated the time needed to fully implement and follow through with the
project strategy. There are too many stakeholders in the three WMAs (consultants,
NGOs, local service providers, DWAF regional offices and directorates). This affects
the creation of CMAs due to timeline constraints which means that the "IWRM
principles will need to be implemented by DWAF or other institutions involved in
water resources management".46 The second progress report states that the additional
time needed to obtain approval of the CMAs at the national DWAF office is an
unavoidable delay that seriously sets back the timeline because none of the WMAs
where the project is active will have operational CMAs before the scheduled end of
the project period.47
The third progress report covers the period from December 2002.48 The tone in the
third progress report indicates more delays and indicates problems with governmental
administrative capacity (and lack of necessary capacity building activities), problems
with stakeholder participation and insufficient time remaining for testing all of the
outputs. Danida approved a budget to extend the project through the end of 2003. The
opinion that the project would achieve its primary objective: "IWRM established in
the three selected WMAs" was still regarded as likely, despite the inability to
44
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establish the three designated CMAs. Instead, it was decided that regional DWAF
offices would function as proxy CMAs until CMAs can be established. The long-term
sustainability of the project hinges on a continued effort by DWAF to sustain
activities associated with community participation, public awareness and capacity
building.
The review of the three progress reports clearly indicates problems with the initial
assumptions, including the amount of time needed to complete the project as well as
the willingness for public participation in the establishment of CMAs and the level
and consistency of the organisational and administrative capacity of DWAF. The
progression of the three outputs provides further detailed information regarding the
development of the project and the specific problems encountered by the project team.
5.9.1.1 Output 3: Institutional Arrangements:
A series of indicators and activities were identified during the inception phase to
address the need to build capacity and establish the most appropriate institutional
arrangements in each of the WMAs. The DWAF and Carl Bro staff recognised from
the beginning the different cultures present within each of the three WMAs and
estimated that the speed of implementation would not be uniform. The list of activities
for this output include preparing a framework for institutional arrangements in the
areas, clarifying the roles and the powers of both the National Department and the
Water Management Institutions (WMIs), facilitate the establishment of WMIs, act as
an adviser and assist in the operation and management of WMIs, and finally
document and evaluate the process and revise strategies as necessary.49 The main
assumptions at this time included:
"Stakeholder participation is guaranteed ...participation takes place in the optimal
way to reflect the local need and level of participation for the specific issue being
discussed... institutions and other stakeholders co-operate constructively in defining
their respective roles...sufficient public interest exists and DWAF commits adequate
financial and human resources to establish and operate CMAs. "50
Challenges to working assumptions, refinement of target stakeholders and other
related issues
Over the following two years, it became apparent to the staff that these assumptions
needed to be refined and specified to suit the environment in the different WMAs.
During the first progress report published in August of 2001, it became apparent that
there was a need to develop a method to ensure that participation took place in the
optimal way to ensure efficiency in the decision-making process. The initial activities
reviewed in the first progress report list a number of open informational meetings
about IWRM and democratic principles of participation.51 The goal of these open
meetings was to address the importance of transparency in the IWRM process from
the outset.
49
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The second progress report indicates that the project team has had problems soliciting
the necessary level of community buy-in into the project- especially from individuals
categorised as Previously of historically Disadvantaged (PDIs) in the CMAs. There is
also a need to "strike a balance between the need for participation and efficiency".52
The third progress report reveals differences in the speed of the creation of CMAs and
differences in establishing working reference groups. The Crocodile-West Marico
(WMA 3) experienced serious setbacks in obtaining a participation commitment from
participants - especially PDIs. The other two WMAs targeted specific stakeholder
groups for further educational activities and facilitated communication between
reference groups, DWAF and local water service providers.
5.9.1.2 Output 4: Stakeholder Participation
This output was designed to increase participation from PDIs in the three WMAs and
can be described as a targeted informational campaign. At the outset of the project
participation in the meetings to establish CMAs came primarily from groups that were
already equipped to articulate their needs while participation from PDIs remained
very low. One of the main goals of this output was to raise participation levels from
PDI groups. Within the scope of the project PDIs are defined as black women, the
rural and urban poor and people of colour. Public participation in the WMAs was to
achieve "equity, efficiency, sustainability and appropriate representation in the
management of water resources..."54 In order to increase participation from these
groups individuals from the community were trained in skills related to
empowerment, community participation and the management of developmental
projects and asked to lead community meetings regarding the establishment of CMAs.
This was seen as an important capacity building step by the project team.55
During the course of the project the different regional cultures in relation to their
history of activism versus non-activism played a role in the extent to which key
stakeholders were informed about the IWRM initiative and their willingness to
participate. Areas with a history or culture of activism were more likely to participate
in the CMA meetings. At the outset of the project, Carl Bro and DWAF conducted
evaluations to assess the participation and level of interest and involvement in the
three WMAs. In the Olifants - Doom they reported a history of public involvement
prior to the forum process. This is due to the existence of water user associations
related to agriculture and irrigation needs.5 Surveys taken immediately after the fist
few CMA meeting, to guage public receptiveness to the project reported that roughly
half of the participants felt they were consulted about the meeting place and time and
about 20% of the participants were women. Despite the culture of activism, 53% of
PDIs reported feeling uncomfortable asking questions in the forum setting although
55% said that they did not feel restrained from asking questions. 70% of forum
participants were informed about CMA related issues and 54% were informed about
the national water act. Finally 70% felt that the CMA process would lead to better
52
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access to water services and 78% reported feeling that their community's vision for
water access would be achieved.57
The situation was quite different in the Crocodile West - Marico WMA. Prior to
project implementation no assessment was made regarding the identification of local
water "champions". There was also no recent history of water activism or education in
the area. The results of the survey conducted after a meeting revealed that 55% of the
participants had not been informed about the CMA establishment process, 56%
indicated that they had not spoken at the meeting and 45% felt that their questions
were not adequately considered. Moreover, 82% felt that issues related to gender,
local community needs, local technologies, traditions and culture were not taken into
consideration.58 The authors of the report noted that there is a high likelihood of PDIs
continuing to be marginalized by the project and a low rate of community
"ownership" of the CMA establishment project. Racial tensions were also cited as a
contributing factor in lack of trust and participation (more so than in WMA 17).59
The situation in these two WMAs illustrates the different level of willingness and
knowledge the participants had going into the CMA process. The overall public
response to the project will be reviewed later in this chapter however, the following
description and analysis of output 5 indicates underlying problems with
communication between DWAF offices and the need for further capacity building
measures within both DWAF and the targeted communities to achieve functioning
CMAs at a later date.
5.9.2.2 Output 5: Capacity Building
The capacity building output was focused both on strengthening DWAF's internal
structure as well as stakeholder participation. As stakeholder participation was
discussed in the last section, this section will focus on the measures needed for
institutional capacity building within DWAF in order to ensure the long-term
sustainability of the project. Capacity building was needed within DWAF mainly due
to government restructuring and decentralisation, hi relation to the restructuring
programs UNESCO, HMO and DWAF convened a three-day seminar focused on
internal capacity building. The success of the IWRM project also depended on direct
contact and communication between the various community forums, representatives
from DWAF regional offices and the DWAF head office.
The key elements in this output concern developing the competencies of DWAF staff
at the national and local level related to their knowledge of IWRM implementation.
Furthermore, targeted meetings aimed at developing the competencies of institutional
stakeholders in the area of water management were conducted for executives,
planners, middle managers, technical managers, water service providers and public
decision makers. The success of this output was to be measured by the number of
stakeholder groups who completes the various training and coaching activities.
The progress reports reveal that DWAF staff was unable to allocate the time needed
for the IWRM project which resulted in delays in approving necessary documents,
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contacting local service providers for workshop participation and lack of staff
participation in planned workshops. Due to the situation at the end of the project (the
CMAs had not yet been established), DFID was forced to step in to provide further
guidance to DWAF regional offices in assuming the responsibilities of CMAs until
the CMAs could be established.
5.10 Analysis of IWRM implementation:
5.10.1 In what way has transparency been improved via
community participation?
The IWRM project in South Africa is part of the government's decentralisation plan
and aims to redress the issue of unequal water access and participation in the water
management process. It is also the feeling of DWAF that local organisations are
naturally better equipped and knowledgeable about the water resource needs in their
area and that community participation will naturally have a positive impact on the
transparency of water policies. The Carl Bro project reveals that where there is a
culture of participation and water consciousness, participation rates are higher.
However, because participation among PDIs, especially women, was considerably
lower than projected, the criterion that CMAs include representation of all local
stakeholders was not fulfilled. In WMA 3, where awareness of water issues and
participation in the CMA process was especially low, there was little local capacity at
the outset with which to create CMAs capable of dealing with the complex issues of
water management on the local level. IWRM is based on a high level of public
participation from important stakeholders, including vulnerable groups. The inability
to attract significant public support in all of the WMAs leads to the conclusion that the
appropriate level of public participation in water management in different areas will
vary from region to region, even within the same country, geographical location and
culture. This means that for IWRM to successfully function as a water management
system, projects should be flexible about allocating sufficient time to create
community interest in the project and build local capacity. If it is assessed that there is
little or no community interest in IWRM, in a certain area the feasibility of this
approach should be reconsidered. Just as PSP may not be the appropriate water
management strategy in all contexts, the same consideration should be given to
IWRM. However, channels for community input and transparency regarding the water
management should present in all water management systems. The results of the Carl
Bro project demonstrate this point.
5.10.2 Public Response
The public response to the implementation of the national IWRM plan can be
described as mixed. Based on initial reports from the outputs related to capacity
building and community participation, staff from Carl Bro experienced difficulties
getting targeted groups to participate which included both DWAF staff as well as
PDIs and other targeted stakeholders. They recognise a need to find new ways to get
these groups to participate. When arranging the meetings, which is one of the first
steps to creating a CMA and Water User Associations (WUA), Carl Bro acting on
behalf of DWAF would arrange for the meeting to be conducted in the local language,
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arrange for transportation to and from the meeting, pay participants for their time and
provide culturally appropriate refreshments. After initial interest in the project wore
off and results were not immediately visible, many communities began to show signs
of apathy, further delaying the progress of the project. As a result of lack of
participation and support on the part of key stakeholders, especially PDIs, the project
was unable to move forward with other plans for CMAs or to explore alternative
institutional arrangements. This is because the success of IWRM, as well as the policy
of decentralisation from DWAF was completely dependent on the assumption that the
public would be interested and engaged in the IWRM process and in the eventual
creation of local CMAs to control their water.
The theory behind IWRM implementation is that feedback and input from local
communities will greatly increase the consumers' role in water allocation and demand
for services in a manner equivalent to a bottom-up management structure. In this case,
the South African government demanded a degree of public participation in water
services, that met predetermined diversity requirements before it would approve
changes to the current water allocation and delivery system. Carl Bro staff have
reported that submitted proposals for the formation of a CMA have been rejected
because these diversity requirements were not fulfilled. In this case, the South African
government is presenting its citizens with a combination of a centralised top-down
structure that demands bottom-up feedback from its citizens. Public participation,
while not mandatory can be construed as somewhat forced; if participation levels to
not meet their criteria, CMAs cannot be formed and DWAF must act as the water
regulator meaning that IWRM is not being implemented as intended. The experiences
of Carl Bro and DWAF beg the question of whether or not this kind of institutional
arrangement is sustainable and whether it will result in improved water and sanitation
services to the poor.
5.11 Free Basic Water
In February of 2001, DWAF announced a policy of 6000 litres of water per month per
to poor households free of charge.60 The provision of this water is supposed to come
from local government and municipal and private water providers, meaning that the
provision of free basic water is one of the issues that may be dealt with by CMAs in
the future. The primary intention of the policy is to ensure that no one is denied access
to water and that access to water for poor people is improved. Furthermore, the
constitution of South Africa declares that access to water is a human right.61 DWAF
has repeatedly acknowledged the connection between access to water, poverty
alleviation and economic development.62 As was seen in the Bolivia case,
improvements or changes to the water infrastructure affect those with a connection to
the network before other consumers.
There are two main issues at stake in operationalising the right to free basic water via
this policy that are relevant to this study. The first concerns the economic feasibility,
who is going to pay for the infrastructure, metering and monitoring of this program.
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The second issue concerns the ability of the local authorities to implement this policy
and succeed in extending access to marginal areas.
5.11.1 Funding Free Basic Water
DWAF has stated that: "Municipalities that are water service providers and water
service providers contracted to municipalities must spend money to supply water to
consumers". Revenue to support the implementation of Free Basic Water could come
from both internal and external funding sources, however internal funding implies a
system of cross-subsidy.63 Cross-subsidy could be implemented in a number of ways,
IBTs (as used in Bolivia), targeted credits or subsidies to the poor or service level
targeting.64 Credits to the poor works by crediting poor households' accounts with
sufficient funds to cover the first 6000 litres per month, so that households would
begin to pay for water after they have used up their free water quota.65 The second
method, targeting through service level means that free water is provided via a service
that restricts the supply to the basic level. Only those that are able to afford an
upgrade will be allowed to have a higher service level - "typically a metered supply",
according to DWAF.66 DWAF mentions that yard tanks (that typically hold 200 - 250
litres of water could be filled once a day by the local water provider and that would
provide families with their monthly free water allotment as well as act as a natural
restricting devise so that families would not use more than they could pay for. The
actual cost of upgrading was not mentioned. Nor was there discussion about how to
determine whether service level upgrades represent a major financial barrier to poor
families.
5.11.2 Implementing Free Basic Water
To date the Free Basic Water policy has reached 52.4% of the poor population in
South Africa.67 The percentage from province to province ranges from a high of 92%
in the Free State to 19% in Limpopo.68 The implementation of Free Basic Water
represents a major achievement in many areas that previously did not have adequate
access to water services. The original goal was that 100% of the population would
have access to Free Basic Water. That goal has been postponed to 2008. Although
the program has succeeded in providing over half of the poor population with Free
Basic Water, there remains 47,6% of the poor population without access to basic
services. The problem with having the municipalities themselves finance the project,
under a policy of cost recovery, means that users are subject to higher water tariffs.
Furthermore, the ability for a municipality to implement the program depends on its
ability and willingness to pay for such services. Opponents of the policy of cost
recovery believe that DWAF implemented this policy to create a more favourable
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environment for privatisation.70 Indeed several tri-sector partnerships have evolved
throughout the country, one in WMA 11 (KwaZulu Natal province). There Vivendi,
which is currently involved in a tri-sector partnership as the water service provider,
has sited a "culture of non-payment (in the townships) and entitlement, stemming
from the apartheid-era resistance movement. This low willingness-to-pay is proving
difficult for Vivendi's pilot project to overcome because it seriously impairs cost
recovery."71 Field research conducted in the area also revealed that residents felt that
the cost of water had been raised considerably. Furthermore, given a culture in which
people were unwilling to pay for services this research indicated that people disposed
to seek out water from alternative sources.72
5.12 Analysis of Desk Study
The case of free basic water encapsulates the dilemma between treating water as an
economic good or a social good and the need to find a way to integrate these two
perspectives. This desk study also demonstrates the complex relationships between
consumers, local regulators and private utilities. The following sections will be a
combined analysis of the IWRM implementation and the implementation of Free
Basic Water within the four focus areas.
5.12.1 What social and economic considerations were /are
being accounted for with the implementation of Free
Basic Water in South Africa?
The creation of the policy of providing free basic water to poor people in South Africa
represents an awareness of the social good nature of water services. While this is an
important point, the political context for the implementation of the policy must not be
lost. DWAF instituted this policy to comply with the South African constitution. At
the same time, DWAF has been undergoing a process of decentralisation, evidenced
by the creation of CM As in the IWRM project. Essentially, DWAF instituted this
policy and left it up to the municipal water providers and private providers to find the
funding for the project - mostly by instituting a policy of cost recovery, with the
limitation that only a small amount of government grant money is available. Without
access to outside funding this could present a natural barrier for implementing free
basic water in more marginalized areas, where the costs of extending the network are
high. The case of Free Basic Water, therefore, presents a social goal, financed by
applying economic principles to water provided above the free level.
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5.12.2 How has the policy of Free Basic Water affected
affordability of water services for poor people?
The introduction of cost recovery and a new tariff system has had a negative impact
on the affordability of water services in poor areas. The field research in KwaZulu
Natal reported (via interviews) that prices were too high.7 Price increases were tied to
a combination of DWAF decentralisation, privatisation and the policy of cost
recovery. The researchers reported seeing residents collect water from polluted
sources to meet their needs. 4 Price increases and an unwillingness to pay for
services, as reported by Vivendi, jeopardises the ability for the program of Free Basic
Water to be financially sustainable and achieve its goal of 100% water coverage by
2008.
5.13 Comparison of the two case studies
The case of privatisation in Bolivia and the South African case of national
implementation of an IWRM strategy represent different solutions to the problem of
increased access to water services for poor people. Each case represents a different
method and philosophy behind the provision of water services and approaches water
management and allocation in a way analogous to the two perspectives of
sustainability presented in chapter 3 in Serageldin's triangles. In Bolivia, the AdT's
first priority was to implement the new tariff system to fund the building of the
Misicuni dam. While the choice to go with the Misicuni dam project was a decision
taken by the municipality - and not AdT, the consequences of that decision led to the
swift implementation of the IDT. The main objectives of that project were efficiency
and growth, followed by equity and poverty reduction provided the tariff plan worked.
AdT's focus on cost recovery and demand management, while good business practice,
did not adequately consider the needs of the community. The project also failed to
provide educational materials or hold meetings to increase transparency and make the
consumers more comfortable with the transfer of control of the utility. The issue of
exclusivity also created a great amount of tension with consumers. Due to inadequate
service, consumers began to form their own institutional arrangements and create their
own rules for access to water. Although these rules certainly were not created for the
greater good of the community or with the environmental health of the water
resources in mind, they demonstrate that people will create arrangements to ensure
that they have access to water when they needed it. The AdT concession changed all
that, by making such arrangements illegal.
In South Africa transparency and community participation were at the top of the water
agenda and guided the process for creating 19 WMAs. The National Water Policy
follows Serageldin's model for environmentally sustainable development, has
apparently caused delays in implementing the project. Instead of empowering people
and giving a sense of ownership over the water management in their area, the
compulsory community participation has caused the greatest problems in
implementing the IWRM initiative. In contrast to Bolivia, all South African residents
are guaranteed a minimum basic water requirement, so the basic needs of all
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consumers will be provided for, provided they municipality can afford to implement
the project. The creation and sustainability of CMAs is contingent upon community
participation. The assumption in the beginning of the project was that consumers
would be eager to participate, but soliciting support and educating the public is a slow
process. Despite delays in all three WMAs in which Carl Bro is consulting, progress
has been made with all three WMAs each of which has submitted a proposal for the
creation of a CM A which are all awaiting approval from DWAF.
5.14 Summary
This chapter has focused on two case studies, one on a specific concession agreement
and a second one on a State sponsored implementation of IWRM and a policy of Free
Basic Water. The following chapter will take stock the ability of private companies to
extend access to poor communities by presenting a set of criteria that combine aspects
of both PSP and IWRM. These criteria define minimum feasibility standards which
must be met by private companies with regard to providing access to water services in
a way that will benefit poor people. The chapter will address: 1) extension of services
to marginal areas, 2) the affordability of the service , 3) increased transparency and
appropriate opportunities for community participation and 4) the appropriate role of
the regulator. The chapter will conclude with some recommendations for context and
institutional arrangements needed for PSP to succeed in promoting equity in water
allocation.
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Chapter 6
Analysis of the Opportunities and
Constraints for the Feasibility of PSP
The following chapter will analyse the conditions and opportunities under which PSP can be
integrated and implemented in the four focus areas of extending access to marginal areas,
affordability, defining the role of the regulator and community participation and
transparency. The two desk studies demonstrated that there are problems with both PSP,
implemented in a purely economic form and IWRM, which relies heavily on community
participation to function. The objective of this thesis is to suggest possible solutions and
methods to integrate the social and economic aspects of water and adapt them to appropriate
and dynamic institutional arrangements for implementation.
6.1 Combining aspects of IWRM and PSP
The principles of IWRM include treating water as a valuable and finite resource, a
participatory approach to management, the inclusion of women in decision-making and
treating water as an economic good.1 These principles reflect a holistic water management
style, which on the surface differs from the business objectives of a private provider. The
principles of IWRM deal with the social, environmental and economic externalities and
realities of water management, while PSP is generally focused on the economic goals of
sustainability (refer to Serageldin's Figure 1). Private operators are predisposed to follow a
standard business plan that includes aspects of economic efficiency. This means investing in
projects where the risk is minimised, initial costs remain acceptably low and where profit is
assured. Investments in water services are generally considered "safe investments" due to the
monopolistic nature of water utilities and the fact that people need water to survive. The
monopolistic nature of the water sector makes the method of privatisation, terms of the
contract and regulatory environment important factors that influence the outcome of
privatisation agreements. This is why it is imperative that social needs are accounted for and
factored into decisions to privatise along with investment strategies. Water provision, unlike
any other good or service, needs to be undertaken with a full understanding of the social,
economic and environmental aspects involved. These three aspects are equally important and
interdependent; they affect the potential benefits and harm that provision (or lack thereof) can
mean to consumers. It is equally important to note that if the underlying causes of operational
problems with public utilities are not adequately addressed the likelihood that the PSP
agreement will succeed is significantly diminished.2 Before addressing the specific
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opportunities and constraints of PSP, it is important to consider the special nature of the risks
involved in privatisation agreements. It is because of these risks that integration of the
economic and social aspects of water is difficult and one of the reasons why PSP is
commonly associated with prices increases.
6.2 The Risks of Privatisation
There are five main characteristics of privatisation that contribute to the difficulty of
successfully engaging private companies in the water and sanitation sector: 1) the level of
natural monopoly and lack of substitute products, 2) the provision of social and
environmental goods and externalities, 3) the relationship between access to water services
and economic development, 4) the presence of high initial capital-intensive investments that
increase private sector risk and 5) the multi-purpose and hydrologically interconnected nature
of the water resource itself.3 The case for PSP comes from the belief that the private sector is
better suited to undertake the kind of investment necessary to improve and expand water
systems infrastructure and management in order to increase efficiency. In many cases,
municipalities turn to private companies because the public utility has failed to provide
adequate water services or lacks sufficient resources to make the kind of investment needed
to make substantial changes to current water services. Major changes in the operation and
integrity of the infrastructure may require a large initial investment, that is only available
through a private company. Capital-intensive initial costs can translate into higher prices
passed on to the user, as in Bolivia. The higher the perceived risk, including construction,
commercial, political or regulatory the higher the cost passed on to the consumer. The
municipality can provide some assurances that will lower the level of risk and therefore the
cost passed on to the user. For example, the municipality might guarantee full cost recovery
on construction projects should the project experience unexpected problems or they could
provide redundancy packages for workers that are laid off as a result of efficiency upgrades.4
The level of risk and uncertainty involved affects the attractiveness of the project during the
bidding process. In the Bolivia example two large water companies, Vivendi and Lyonnaise
des Eaux did not submit bids, for the Cochabamba project, leaving AdT as the sole bidder.
Perhaps Vivendi, with a recently soured concession agreement in Argentina, and Lyonnaise
des Eaux, with a concession in La Paz, Bolivia had a much better understanding of the risks
involved in further investment in that area. Issues of economic efficiency and feasibility are
linked to the problem of integrating the economic and social aspects of water management
and deciding under which conditions this is feasible. Initially, a high level of financial risk
may act as a deterrent for companies, or may induce the regulator to compromise on social
issues in exchange for a signed contract. The bidding process and initial contract negotiations
are the times when the four focus areas must be discussed. This will give both the perspective
operator and the regulator an opportunity to define their positions in relation to each other as
well as the issues of extending access, community participation and affordability. This
negotiation process is of crucial importance because it allows both the regulator and
perspective operator time to discuss the risks, expectations and working relationship before
the contract has been signed. The bidding process is also a time to directly address the
potential financial risks related to extending access to marginal areas in addition to the types
of tariff structures that need to be put in place so that water services are affordable to
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consumers while brining in enough revenue to cover supply costs, debt and create an
acceptable profit margin for the company. If the costs associated with a project to increase the
volume of water available in an area, such as the MMP, are too expensive to roll into a tariff
structure and pass the costs onto the consumer, the government is responsible for partially
subsidising the project. A similar statement can be made regarding South Africa's policy of
Free Water, the water provider, public or private, is responsible for devising a tariff structure
that will cover the cost of providing Free Water to communities in the service area. They are
also responsible for financing any required changes to the infrastructure that are needed to
distribute water to areas that do not have satisfactory access to the network.
The level of risk entailed in a privatisation agreement as well as the type of privatisation
applied (BOOT, concession etc.) will elicit certain demands from the bidder, such as
exclusivity. If a large initial investment is needed, the private utility may not be initially
interested in extending access to marginal areas (and therefore taking on more risk), or may
not feel a responsibility to consult with local stakeholders about the most appropriate
technological solution(s) for their area if they are very concerned about costs. Risk is a large
factor that determines the willingness of private utilities to comply with the social-good-
oriented demands of the regulator. This is also why it is important for the regulator to be
specific about benchmarks regarding extending access or practices for stakeholder
consultation in the contract. The following sections will analyse the working questions
presented in the introduction in order to translate the risks associated with PSP into specific
recommendations for how PSP can be implemented in an economically and socially
sustainable manner.
6.3 Analysis of Working Questions
The working questions presented in the introduction identify four focus areas for further
analysis as they directly relate to the constraints and opportunities for PSP to benefit the poor.
The working questions focus on the following four themes: 1) extending access, 2)
affordability, 3) community participation and transparency and 4) defining the appropriate
role of the regulator as well as specifying what if any functions or services should remain in
public hands. The final theme, the role and responsibilities of the regulator, will be analysed
using Ostroms theory of institutional rational choice as it relates to determining the most
appropriate institutional arrangements for regulating and providing water services as well as
the responsibilities that should remain under public control.
6.3.1 "How are the social and economic values of water reconciled
or accounted for when attempting to extend access to
marginal areas?"
Extending access to marginal areas is one of the most salient and tricky issues to deal with in
both PSP contracts and publicly run water utilities because it combines several areas of risk.
Initially, there may be hesitation from both the private utility and the public regulator in their
desire to extend access. Marginal areas are problematic because in many cases they are not
officially recognised as places of residence by the State. People do not have land rights to
"their" property and standard definitions of housing types and neighbourhood zoning may not
match the definitions of either the private utility or public regulator.5 Moreover, there may be
5
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hesitation on behalf of the public regulator to extend basic services to these areas because it
will legitimise the presence of people on the land. They may feel that the lack of basic
services or the flat out denial of services will act as a deterrent and persuade people to move
away from these settlements.
The private utility may not be overly anxious to extend services to these areas because: they
usually represent a large initial investment; these neighbourhoods may not be located near the
network the neighbourhood layout may be "irregular", and payment, billing and monitoring is
not as straightforward as it is in other areas. The first issue of location and extending the
network, definitely represents a certain degree of financial risk. However, PSP is often
undertaken specifically because private companies (in conjunction with a loan from a
development bank) have the financial resources to improve and expand the network - this
includes marginal areas. Although the layout of marginal neighbourhoods may differ from
standard neighbourhood layouts, they still constitute a recognisable structure that can be used
in service delivery.6 The final economic consideration involves billing, monitoring and
payment this issue will be addressed in the next section.
Specific goals for an expanded service area which, could be described as a set number of
households, standpipes / water points, geographic area, etc. by a certain date, should be
clearly stipulated in the privatisation contract. These goals should be considered, "hard"
goals, which the private water authority will be required to meet by the dates mentioned in
the contract. One of the problems with past PSP agreements is that when they consider where
to extend access, one of the major deciding factors is the financial viability of a certain area
meaning that they can chose to extend access to an area that they feel is appropriate.
Appropriate in this context refers to likelihood of paying for the service or proximity to the
existing network (that reduces initial investment costs). The private utility has a degree of
flexibility to decide how to comply with benchmarks for extended access as opposed to
having the target areas and timelines decided for them by the regulator.7 This is why specific
areas as well as numbers of extra connections should be tied to performance indicators and
benchmarks laid out in the contract. To make extending access into marginal areas more
feasible, cross subsidisation via IBTs may present a good option if there is a reasonable
distribution of consumers in different income groups. If the vast majority of the population
lives below the poverty line and is eligible to receive benefits from cross subsidisation, an
IBT may not be feasible due to the necessity for imposing unreasonable prices on wealthier
economic groups. In some cases the municipality might be willing to fund "social" water
points for communities that are in need of immediate assistance with their water supply. The
cost of setting up these "social" water points is reduced because local community members
provide free labour and they are also taught basic maintenance, making the water source
more sustainable and less expensive to install.
Extending access via the main water infrastructure may not always be feasible, especially in
rural areas. This is why including local water vendors from the informal sector into an initial
plan to extend access might create positive short-term results. Local water vendors may feel
threatened by the private water utility because the ultimate goal of the utility is to extend
access and thereby take away their consumer base. Using local water vendors as regulated
curriers presents some risk but would also allow the private utility to capitalise on immediate,
visible improvements in service to areas that may have to wait years before they will have
6
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access to the main network. This will also remove some of the tension and competition that
might otherwise occur between the water vendors and the private utility. Finally, to aid in
local acceptance and overcome initial anxiety about the private utility, the water vendors
could use water company trucks and equipment, so that the local population can begin to
associate the new prices and level of service with the water utility instead of the private
vendor. In the Bolivia case, the exclusivity of the AdT concession agreement made the
activities of the local water vendors illegal. This quickly created a vacuum of service in areas
not connected to the main network that had relied on water vendors for their water supply.
Poor households stand to gain the most from the extension of water services into their area.
The availability of water and sanitation will promote economic development and reduce the
mortality rate due to water borne diseases. The social considerations of extending access can
be measured in decreased prevalence of diseases, longer life expectancy and a lower child
mortality rate. In addition, the ultimate benefits from extending access can only be realised
when coupled with education regarding the hygienic use of water services (i.e.: not placing
latrines next to drinking water sources, and using soap, ash or sand to wash hands). The
social benefits have the potential to have positive long-term effects on the development in an
area. The problem lies in the word long-term; this kind of social investment may not be
something the company is interested in. They are only interested in the benefits and profit
they can make during the period of their contract. This is why decisions regarding where
access should be extended to and when that should happen are problematic, both from the
perspective of the company and the public regulator, as they both may have reasons for
postponing the extension of services in this area. In South Africa the policy of Free Basic
Water implies that there should be universal access to water services throughout the country.
However, the water service providers are responsible for funding the policy though cost
recovery, which stagnated the project and delayed the extension of service to many areas.
6.3.2 "What is the most effective method to make water services
affordable for the poorest citizens?"
At the outset it is important to dispel the myth that poor people are either unwilling or
incapable of paying for water services. As seen in the desk studies, non-payment occurs when
the quality of service of water is bad. There is a widespread belief that the payment structure
is morally wrong when there is a culture of opportunistic behaviour related to few or no
consequences for non-payment.9 The issue of affordability includes willingness-to-pay,
conservation through demand management, cost recovery, tariff systems and the right to a
basic water requirement. As previously mentioned, the implementation and level of new tariff
systems, possibly in the form of IBTs or lifeline tariffs, will depend on the level and types of
risk associated with the investment. Private water authorities should always implement a
pricing system that accurately reflects both the social and economic good aspects of water
provision, in keeping with the tenants of IWRM. The appropriateness and feasibility of a
specific pricing system or tariff structure is very context specific and should not be
generalised. What works in Bolivia may not be appropriate in South Africa. This relates to
the level of natural scarcity of water and what kind of payment system is economically and
culturally appropriate. Water is always treated as an economic good through PSP, the
problem is implementing policies that recognise water as a human right and social good.
9
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Basic water requirements (BWR) or lifeline tariff systems ensure that the poorest people in
society receive at least 25 lpcd. within 200 meters of their home. This number has been
agreed upon as the minimum water requirement by the WHO. Due to pressures on the water
resource itself and the need to generate a return on the investment BWR should only be
provided free of charge to those who qualify based on income, household size, location and
any other context specific criterion that would place them in a needy group. BWR should not
be extended to all socio-economic groups in an area because that undermines the concept of
treating water as an economic good and may put undo pressure on the environment in times
of natural water scarcity. Individuals who can pay for at least the full supply cost of water
should be required to do so.
Water itself as a resource should be considered a public good, because of the social value of
the resource, however, water services that provide potable water through a network are not
public goods. Water services fall into the categories of private, toll or common-pool goods
depending on the method used to exclude potential users and the subtractability of the
resource. Water provided through a network where it is difficult to control access, either for
political or technological reasons is considered a CPR because of the combination of easy
access and subtractability. Depending on location and the prevalence of natural water
scarcity, it is possible for individual users to go to the original water resource and collect
water that way. Because of the different methods of distributing water and the varying levels
of technological solutions that effect the price of water, water can be distributed in a way that
makes it affordable for poor communities. The needs of the poor are often invisible to policy-
makers, because they are often overlooked as a key stakeholder group. Greater participation
and involvement from the public in general and poor communities in particular may enable
the public regulator and private utility operator to gain a better understanding about the needs
of different communities while simultaneously giving the community members a sense of
ownership through participation.
In Kathmandu, the NGO Forum proposed a two-tiered water tariff system that combines the
concepts of recognising the human right to water and the need to treat water as an economic
good. In the first tier water is priced as a basic requirement, where the consumer pays only
for the O&M costs for 6 cu. m. per household per month that are delivered to the household
at a cost of approximately $2.40 - roughly equivalent to 3% of the monthly income for poor
families. In the second tier water is priced as a full economic good, meaning that the
consumer pays the full cost which includes: O&M, financing, capital repayment, cross-
subsidy and regulation cost. This is charged for all use over 6 cu. m. per month per
household. The benefit of this system of tariffs is that it makes supplying water economically
feasible for the water authority and affordable to the consumers. One of the drawbacks of this
system is that installation of a water container and possibly a water meter on poor households
is not covered by the O&M costs. The family must either pay for this initial cost itself or the
government must subsidise this fee for those that are unable to pay for the initial connection
fee.
Finally, the private water utility may need to implement a series of price hikes to cover the
cost of repairing and extending the main network or larger construction projects, such as a
dam or tunnel. Increases in prices or tariff structures should be linked to visible
10
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improvements in service.11 This will create an incentive for the utility to improve
performance and increase the value of the service and the water for the consumers. In the
Bolivia case, we saw the effect of implementing price increases prior to improvements in
service.
6.3.3 "In what way could community participation in water decision-
making improve transparency and influence both the water
authority and the water regulator?"
Community participation in the planning of water services and allocation of resources is one
of the hallmarks of IWRM. Situations of historical inequity and the relationship between
women and water collection make participation from these groups especially important.
Participation should be voluntary and follow basic democratic principles. The experience of
implementing CMAs in South Africa shows that water projects that demand community
participation in a top-down fashion puts pressure on the participants and limits the quality of
input received via water board meetings. A history of political or community activism in an
area is a good indicator as to what reasonable expectations can be made for community
engagement in water projects. This does not, however, mean that areas without a history of
community involvement should be "screened" out of possible participation in water
management. More time and resources will be needed to build local community and
government capacity and stimulate interest in local water management schemes. A concerted
effort should be made to include key stakeholders in the water decision-making process
because the poor are often invisible and have no voice in local government and they stand to
benefit the most from water access. In many cases, they live in squatter areas where they have
no recognised property rights. Lack of communication between the private water authority
and this important stakeholder group often leads to two scenarios: 1) the provision of water
services that are inappropriate or 2) no service at all - the community is bypassed
altogether.12 Private companies (especially foreign) assuming control of a local water utility
may not be aware of the special water needs of poor communities and are very dependent on
the decisions and advice of planners and local authorities. It is imperative that the private
water utility understands the needs of unserved communities so that consideration of
upgrades and extension of service can be included in the contract from the very beginning.
Soliciting community participation can take the form of meetings, held in the local area at a
time convenient to the community, to discuss specific issues such as the placement of
waterpoints and information about capacity building activities such as simple repairs and
installation. Increased water awareness on the part of community members will enable them
to consider their personal water use and to understand the services they are/will be paying for.
From the perspective of the regulator or the private operator, community involvement
provides a unique opportunity for essential stakeholders to express their needs, the problems
they are experiencing and their expectations of service. Meetings could also be used to
determine appropriate pricing and monitoring strategies. In addition to information
dissemination about water services, the local community should be educated about the
hygienic use of the water pump or latrine so they can maximise the health benefits. The
private company may feel that this final step lies outside the realm of their responsibilities,
11
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however, they could carry out this human rights related promotional activity in cooperation
with an NGO or educational institution.
Involving the local community in the decision-making and installation (if possible) of basic
water services will give them a sense of ownership and contribute to the long-term
sustainability of the service and can only come from the genuine involvement of the
community.13 These kinds of activities are both time intensive and expensive. The cost of
community consultation and capacity building should be figured into the contract.
Community initiatives may be more effectively implemented in partnership with the local
government or NGO. The community-based approach to water management allows for
custom made options to evolve that suit the needs of an individual community.
In terms of transparency, the various bids under consideration for a privatisation agreement as
well as the negotiations over the agreement and final contract should be made available to all
affected stakeholders.14 Community representatives should have the option of attending
performance reviews. Decisions that directly affect the consumer should be published and
made available to the public. Increased transparency, beginning with the bidding process, in
concert with increased community participation will make key stakeholders aware of how the
upcoming privatisation agreement will affect their access to water and any changes in the
tariff structure. Increased transparency via public advisory committees with broad public
representation will create a new avenue for public feedback and education regarding the PSP
agreement.15 The formation of these committees may require the assistance of an NGO for
capacity building, technical expertise and funding. Once the CMAs are formed in South
Africa one of their functions will be to inform the water utility of their needs.
6.3.4 "What is the appropriate role of the regulator? Are there some
functions that should always remain in public hands under
privatisation?"
The issue of defining the appropriate role for the regulator is very difficult and context
dependent. It involves finding a balance between government interference and utility
accountability as well as between micromanagement and utility autonomy. Again, the
stability of the government, its familiarity and willingness to implement democratic
principles and to follow standard business principles are all variables in determining the
appropriate role of the regulator and in determining whether PSP is an appropriate approach
within a given context. One of the central problems in answering this working question is that
weak governments, or developing democracies, are more likely to have problems operating
the water utility in a manner that can meet the basic needs of the majority of their citizens. In
this situation, the government may apply for a loan from a development bank or open a
bidding process directly for private involvement. The government may or may not have a
fully developed plan that includes expectations or specific problem areas that must be
addressed through the privatisation scheme. The private utility may have had previous
experiences with PSP agreements in a variety of countries through which it has decided in
advance what terms are acceptable and what risks they are willing to take with the
investment. This situation presents an uneven power dynamic between the government and
the private company before negotiations have even begun. If the government is weak, or
13
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unsure of the extent of its needs, or what responsibilities it wants to privatise or keep in
public hands the overall probability of success of the project is questionable. Capacity
building and involvement of a third party, such as an NGO could help facilitate negotiations
and help the government understand where it should set boundaries and where it might be
more flexible as it defines its relationship with the private utility operator.
The privatisation of a water utility does not relieve the public sector of the burden of
regulating the utility. The monopolistic nature of the water and sanitation sector imply that a
significant degree of public regulation will always be required to ensure the sustainable and
equitable distribution of water services. Privatisation changes the role of the public sector; it
does not replace or assume all the roles of the public sector. Under a privatisation agreement,
the public government should maintain ownership of the water resource, and in some cases
the water infrastructure. The reasons for this can be found in Ostrom, the water resources,
such as underground aquifers and rivers benefit all users in a variety of ways and can be
considered pure public goods. Pure public goods are best managed by public institutional
arrangements. The public authorities should be responsible for the ensuring that the integrity
of the ecosystem of the local water resource remains intact and for overseeing the
implementation of social objectives. These social-good aspects are of little interest to a
private utility because there is little economic incentive to regulate access to the good.
Furthermore, depending on the type and length of time of the privatisation agreement, the
private utility may have little interest in diverting their resources towards, protecting
ecosystem health, unless they felt that they could in some tangible way benefit from this type
of activity. Pricing decisions are another area that should remain in the public domain. The
private utility may generate proposals for changes in the tariff structure to fit the type and
cost of the technology used for improving access within the service area. However, the public
regulator should have veto power if they have reason to believe that a large sector of the
population will have difficulty paying for access to the resource. This veto power accorded to
the regulator should be in place because if a portion of the population is unable to pay for
access they will not be able to benefit from the social good aspects of water including health
and economic development. Defining the new roles of both the utility and the regulator is an
important first step; it creates a system of accountability between regulator and utility. Figure
8 represents the list of regulatory tasks that must be undertaken by the public regulator to
ensure customer protection under privatisation.
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Figure 8 above, illustrates the functions that should be assumed by the public regulator under
privatisation. Environmental regulation of the water utility includes water right allocation and
protection mechanisms for the implementation of conservation techniques (usually via
demand management and IBTs). Environmental Agencies should be in charge of ensuring
that a concept similar to South Africa's concept of the reserve (see below) is in place and that
pumping from aquifers does not exceed the groundwater recharge rate. The concept of the
reserve includes the water needed to meet basic human needs and protect aquatic ecosystems.
The water reserved for these functions has first priority and water cannot be allocated and
distributed to other users unless this need is met.17 The environmental agency also has the
responsibility to monitor upstream activity to ensure that the quality of water being provided
to consumers is not polluted with industrial or agricultural run-off and can be cleaned by the
system established by the private utility.
The state regulator should act as a guarantor that a certain level of affordable provision will
be met. Note that this is not the same as ensuring that the basic needs of poorer households
are met.18 State regulators can ensure that a certain level of affordable provision is attained by
implementing a policy of cross-subsidisation in the tariff structure or by subsidising the initial
16
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connection of poor households to the network. Often the initial connection cost is prohibitive
to poor users.
Under privatisation, the public sector is no longer responsible for either the provision of
services or for regulating the provision of services. Since this situation creates the opportunity
for increased transparency and accountability it might also minimise corruption. The private
utility must always fulfil the terms of the contract that specify extended access to services,
public participation and tariff information. Clearly outlining the expectations of the regulator
in these three areas may also serve to decrease regulatory risk. The social and environmental
aspects of water provision are best achieved by the implementation of policies that are first
approved by the regulator and later checked via government agencies (environmental, health
and safety, economic development etc.)
6.4 What are the implications of PSP on the public sector
Under PSP agreements, the possibility exists for the improvement of water services to poor
areas. This cannot be achieved via private investment in water utilities alone. Real success of
PSP in the water and sanitation sector will necessitate capacity building of strong public
regulators and community water associations. The water utility itself needs to be monitored
and required to meet specific milestones for increased access and visible improvements in
service and efficiency as outlined in the contract. Critics of PSP point to a fixation on
creating profit and a blatant disregard for the social and economic aspects and externalities of
water provision. They cite this as a primary reason to avoid privatisation at all costs. It must
be recognised however, that privatisation alone, cannot be expected to serve as a panacea for
the lack of adequate drinking water and sanitation services available to poor people. On the
other hand, privatisation does provide badly needed capital, outside expertise and an
opportunity to develop local public regulatory capacity. Decentralised water services may
allow for added the benefits of increased responsiveness to user needs including the
rehabilitation of waterpoints.19 The opening up and decentralisation of one area of
government control may also encourage greater NGO participation in assessment of
community needs and promotion of capacity building activities during public agencies'
transition from operator to regulator. PSP is a temporary solution to problems with the public
utility. PSP can have its most devastating effects if it is not reversible. Concession
agreements can cover a time span of up to 50 years, approximately two generations in most
countries. For PSP to be successful and ultimately beneficial to all residents and especially
the poor, local people need to be involved in the management and operation of the utility and
know how to repair, expand and upgrade all aspects of the network. The service area should
not be dependent on the concessionaire after the concession period is over and the utility
becomes public again. Steps need to be taken throughout the privatisation process to ensure
that PSP is reversible.
19
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6.5 Determining the most appropriate institutional
arrangements
This issue has been touched upon in the previous section but will now be analysed in terms of
Ostrom's theory to gain a better understanding of the behaviour and stakeholders involved in
PSP. One of the difficulties with the provision of water services in general and PSP in
particular is that there are a number of actors involved. The introduction of privatisation, and
possibly an NGO to help facilitate this process, while potentially beneficial in the long-run
may complicate matters by bringing more actors into the situation. Ostrom argues that:
" 'getting the institutions right' is a difficult, time consuming, conflict-invoking process. It is a
process that requires reliable information about time and place variables as well as a broad
repertoire of culturally acceptable rules. New institutional arrangements do not work in the
field as they do in abstract models unless the models are well specified and empirically valid
and the participants in afield setting understand how to make the new rules work. "20
Recognising that institutional arrangements suggested in this study cannot automatically be
transferred to a field setting. I propose that information from the desk studies does lead to
some general guidelines or suggestions for institutional arrangements directly related to the
provision of water services. There are at least three key stakeholder groups in any given
privatisation arrangement: the municipality (State), private company and the consumers.
Consumer groups can be further subdivided by socio-economic class, gender and race, if
relevant. One of the hallmarks of CPRs is that stakeholders agree on a common set of rules
that guide the use and allocation of the resource. This type of institutional arrangement is
most common to cooperative arrangements, however, information from the desk studies
suggests that more voluntary input from consumers is one of the key ingredients in
integrating the principles of IWRM with PSP.
The rules that must be endorsed by all the various stakeholders include specific timelines and
expectations about extending access to marginal areas, what level of service they can expect
(standpipes, house connections etc.) and methods for payment and monitoring. Another issue
that needs to be resolved between stakeholders is tariff structure, whether segments of society
will receive financial assistance via cross-subsidies or direct government subsidies. A related
issue is whether the delivery of basic water services to poor areas is a top priority and if so
the specifics of how it will be implemented. Community participation and measures to
increase transparency in itself is another key issue that poses unique challenges. The success
of management and allocation of water resources in the CPR setting depends on the
willingness and commitment of the stakeholders to adhere to the rules. Ostrom describes this
issue as the "problem of credible commitment".21
The rules specified during the negotiation period with all the stakeholders will cover how
many units of the resource will be allocated to each user - or if the number of units will be
limited by financial ability to pay for the units.22 If decisions are implemented immediately
after they are taken and water is allocated in accordance with the contract, then the system
will be sustained over time and all the stakeholders will know how much water they are
entitled to receive. For water management to function in the form of a CPR, however, all
20
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parties must agree to follow the rules. If there is a culture of opportunistic behaviour (ie:
using water but not paying the bills) then the integrity of the CPR management system will be
significantly compromised.23 The complicated relationships and power dynamic between the
regulator, operator and consumers make the possibility of implementing an effective and
functional CPR very difficult.
The issue of whether a public or private institutional arrangement is the most appropriate
depends on the way the relationship is defined between the regulator and the utility. It also
depends on the division of functions and ownership of various aspects and resources that are
a part of water management. In a concession agreement the infrastructure and often the water
resource itself is privatised.24 In operation and management contracts the infrastructure and
resource remains in public hands. A concession agreement entails a larger financial
investment which is aimed at drastically changing and extending the network and maximising
the benefit from local water resources, so the same degree of potential benefit is not present
in both privatisation agreements. I have previously argued that the water resources, decisions
about pricing and the responsibility of controlling the quality of the water and safeguarding
ecosystem health should remain in the public domain. It can be argued that certain
"hardware" aspects of the infrastructure should remain in the public domain, which adds to
the argument for increased public influence, through both the regulator and through
community participation. The social and economic attributes of providing water services
suggest that the optimal institutional arrangement is one where the regulator oversees the
utility and sets performance targets for the utility regarding extending access, affordability,
community participation and transparency. The utility, although bound by contractual
obligations is relatively autonomous in the operation and maintenance of the utility. Key
stakeholders, including community members from the poorest areas should have a forum for
expressing their water service needs to both the regulator (because they have the ultimate
responsibility for fulfilling their needs) and to the private utility (because they are responsible
for implementing the changes necessary to meet the needs).
In an ideal situation, the public sector needs to be a strong regulator and the private operator
autonomous. Both parties should implement decisions about allocation and development of
the network in a transparent manner and they should be held accountable to each other and to
consumers. I find this scenario very unlikely to occur. The best prospect for PSP in
developing countries is the introduction of NGOs to assist as a facilitator in capacity building
in the government and in the affected communities. Extending access to areas that do not
meet WHO water access requirements and assisting the municipality in the transition from
utility operator to regulator should be the top priorities. Without these components, PSP will
not result in a meaningful improvement in water access for poor communities.
6.6 Summary
This chapter reviewed the components of IWRM that need to be integrated to a larger degree
into PSP agreements. In addition, the risks particular to PSP in the water sector were
reviewed as they contribute to the attractiveness of a potential privatisation agreement and
eventually to the pricing structure. The conditions of feasibility for the integration of these
two forms of water governance were presented as well as options for their implementation.
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The importance of capacity building, for both the public regulator and community water user
groups, and the potential for NGO involvement in this process was also discussed. Finally,
the ability for PSP to be implemented a manner consistent with the principles of IWRM in an
area with strong or weak regulators was explored in depth. Capacity building should be
undertaken at the community level as well as at different levels of government to ensure that
PSP is implemented in a socially sensitive manner that directly addresses the need to extend
and improve water access to poor communities. Unless PSP implementation is coupled with
capacity building measures, PSP will not result in long-term, meaningful improvements for
poor people.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
PSP has the potential to generate significant progress in the water and sanitation
sector. Despite problems encountered by both PSP agreements in a number of
countries, as well as difficulties implementing IWRM initiatives, socially and
environmentally responsible PSP agreements have the potential to improve water
access for poor people. In many countries, the increasing presence of private
companies is attributable to the failure of the public utility (real or perceived) to
deliver an adequate water supply to consumers. The combination of aspects of IWRM
with PSP presents an opportunity for growth and increased efficiency that could
ultimately lead to improved economic development, a higher standard of living, and
improved human and ecosystem health. This thesis has questioned the ability of
private utilities to improve water access for poor people, and furthermore examined
the opportunities and constraints that ultimately determine the feasibility of PSP in
meeting this goal.
Efforts to privatise water utilities must address the four main issues of social and
economic for: extending access, affordability and community participation, increased
transparency, and defining the role of the regulator. Water is a scarce resource and the
initial costs and risks involved in privatisation agreements requires the
acknowledgement that water is both an economic and social good especially
important. Poor people have been traditionally left out of decision-making regarding
water allocation, placement of waterpoints etc. Misunderstandings on the part of
international water utilities relying on insufficient information complicates the
situation and makes the needs of poor communities invisible to water utilities.
Community participation on water boards, via meetings and other specifically
targeted capacity building measures will help the private utilities understand both the
gravity of the water supply situation in these areas and motivate them to develop the
appropriate form of water provision for that area.
In both the IWRM case in South Africa and the PSP case in Bolivia, it became
apparent that the most important condition or constraint regarding the feasibility of
PSP was the presence of a well established regulatory institution to manage the utility.
Without the presence of a local, public regulatory structure, the issues of extending
access, affordability and community participation, and transparency cannot be
addressed in a meaningful way. The failures of both PSP and IWRM initiatives in the
past point to a need for the integration of social, environmental and economic
principles in the privatisation contract and the urgent need to improve capacity
building in state regulatory agencies so that they are better equipped to deal with the
transition from utility operator to regulator. In order to address the underlying causes
of the initial failure of the public utility, there must be clear lines of communication
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between the regulator, utility and representatives from the local community. All three
systems need to be in place in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of
improvements implemented under PSP agreements. Unfortunately, privatisation often
occurs in areas without a strong regulatory environment. A situation of a strong and
well organised private utility with a weak public regulator, in an area lacking even
basic community participation is a recipe for unimproved water access to poor
consumers and will most likely result in project failure. In such a situation, it would
be best either not to privatise the utility or to combine any privatisation effort with an
intense capacity building initiative directed at regional and local water regulators and
local communities.
The new approach to water management presented in this report has resulted from a
review of two earlier models of water management. Recommendations are based on
an analysis of the problems experienced during implementation of both previous
approaches. Although the actual success or failure of any PSP agreement will be
highly context dependent, the guidelines presented in the previous chapter can help
private utilities avoid common problem areas with the public regulator and local water
users. The bottom-line is that if private utilities wish to succeed, they must begin with
a comprehensive social, economic and cultural assessment that provides them with a
sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the water and sanitation needs of poorer
communities. They must then forge a contract that realistically incorporates
feasibility, cost, institutional and idiosyncratic regional factors if they are to
adequately and appropriately provide a sufficient water supply to all segments of the
population.
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